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Although good information is critical to effective decisionmaking, public agents’ private 
incentives to invest in gathering information may not align with the social interest in 
their doing so.  This Article considers how legal-institutional design choices affect 
government decisionmakers’ incentive to invest in information, as well as how to manage 
the inevitable trade-off between promoting efficient use of information ex post and 
stimulating efficient acquisition of information ex ante.  Using a simple theoretical 
framework, the Article considers a range of techniques for incentivizing information 
gathering, with particular attention to the structure of public institutions and public law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Good information is the lifeblood of effective governance.1  In myr-
iad contexts — from legislation to regulation to adjudication — public 
decisionmakers must operate in uncertain environments where the op-
timal choice depends, often substantially, on information about the 
likely consequences of different courses of action.  This is not to say 
that these public decisions are or could be value-free exercises in tech-
nocratic neutrality.  Nor is it to say that the relevant evidence must be 
of any particular type (for example, quantitative data) or that the 
analysis of such evidence must take any particular form (for example, 
cost-benefit analysis).  It is rather to make the commonplace observa-
tion — so obvious that it ought to be uncontroversial — that many 
public decisions turn on some form of predictive judgment, such that a 
decisionmaker’s choice does and should depend on the quality and 
content of the information available to her. 
The importance of information is familiar to scholars who study 
how legal institutions structure and influence public decisionmaking.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Eric Biber, Dan Carpenter, Glenn 
Cohen, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, Barry Friedman, Sean Gailmard, Jacob Gersen, Jill Gol-
denziel, Jim Greiner, Dan Ho, Daryl Levinson, Brian Mannix, Jide Nzelibe, Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, John Patty, Nicola Persico, Eric Posner, Ben Roin, Ben Sachs, Fred Schauer, Kathy 
Spier, Bill Stuntz, Eric Talley, Adrian Vermeule, Mila Versteeg, and Kathy Zeiler, as well as par-
ticipants in faculty workshops at Harvard Law School and the Center for International Develop-
ment at Harvard University, the University of Chicago conference “Rational Choice and Constitu-
tional Law,” and the University of Pennsylvania Law School/George Washington University 
conference “Institutions and Incentives in Regulatory Science,” for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. 
  1  Cf. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory 
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the 
Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 259 (1986).    
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Indeed, an important body of legal scholarship — which developed out 
of the Legal Process tradition — focuses on how to allocate authority 
among different potential decisionmakers (legislatures, chief execu-
tives, bureaucrats, judges, juries, voters, and others) in light of their 
relative “institutional competence,” a phrase that connotes, among oth-
er things, expertise and access to information.2  This literature also of-
ten considers how legal and political institutions might mitigate the 
principal-agent problem that can arise when the decisionmaker with 
the most expertise about some topic does not have the right prefer-
ences from the point of view of the relevant principal.3  A related body 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  On the importance of institutional competence to the Legal Process school, see HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 168–74, 696, 1009–10, 1111 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); and William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An 
Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra, at li, lx–lxi, 
xci–xcvi.  See also Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Dis-
course, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996); Jeffrey Rudd, 
The Evolution of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional Competence” Theme: Unintended Con-
sequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1052–54 (2006); Anthony J. Sebok, 
Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1578–84 (1996) (book review). 
    Numerous modern scholars have built on the Legal Process tradition, producing a growing 
and increasingly sophisticated body of work that considers how public law institutions should 
allocate authority among various government decisionmakers, based on their relative institutional 
competence.  See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 3–13 (1994); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN,  ONE  CASE  AT  A  TIME  259–63 ( 1999); ADRIAN  VERMEULE,  JUDGING  UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 63–85 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 74–75 (2008); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 490–97 (2005); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of 
Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 D UKE L.J. 1169, 1209–13 (2001); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1171–75 (2008); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1274,  1291 ( 2006); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional 
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Y ALE L.J. 1707, 1713–16 
(2002); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1279–86 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in 
State and Local Government Law, 80 V A. L. REV. 625, 631–35 (1994); Jeff A. King, Institutional 
Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 O.J.L.S. 409, 432–40 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond 
Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 650–54 (2001); Nina 
A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption,  102 N W.  U.  L.  REV.  695,  717–22 
(2008); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 Y ALE L.J. 2512, 
2514–16 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking,  73 U.  CHI.  L. 
REV. 933, 934–37 (2006); Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey 
Martin, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 288–95; Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal 
Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 640–49 (2010); Ca-
therine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 449, 484–90 (2008); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 V A. L. REV. 93, 126–43 (2005); 
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 
914–19 (2003); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65–
69, 91–95 (2004). 
  3  See, e.g., Alícia Adserà et al., Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of 
Government, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 445, 447–49 (2003); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The 
    
2011]  INFORMATION ACQUISITION  1425 
of scholarship investigates how legal and political institutions may en-
courage or inhibit the efficient aggregation of information from mul-
tiple sources.4 
In focusing on how to encourage the most effective use of informa-
tion (say, by allocating authority to the best-informed agents, aligning 
agents’ policy preferences with the principal’s, or ensuring efficient 
aggregation of information from multiple sources), the extant public 
law literature tends to neglect the related but distinct challenge of en-
couraging the efficient acquisition of information.5  Many discussions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 684–89 (2004); Christopher R. Berry & Ja-
cob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1391–98 (2008); Stephanos 
Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 979–
83,  996–97 ( 2009); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (1998); Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hybr-
id Democracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2006); Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 301, 309–15 (2010); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 840–41 (2006); Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of 
Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 49, 50–55 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & 
Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries,  85 V A.  L.  REV.  1627,  1635–38,  1649–52 
(1999); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001); Jona-
than R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An 
Interest Group Model, 86 C OLUM. L. REV. 223, 244–46 (1986); David Markell, “Slack” in the 
Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. 
REV.  1, 19–23 (2005); Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: 
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 639–
43 (2010); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 
897–910 (2007); David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administra-
tive Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2214–23 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Po-
litical Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 70 (2008). 
  4  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 7–16 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter SUNSTEIN,  MANY  MINDS]; CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  INFOTOPIA  197–216 ( 2006); ADRIAN 
VERMEULE,  LAW  AND  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  79–95 ( 2009); Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary 
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 266–78 (2007); Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 734–46 (2001); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelli-
gence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World,  94 C ALIF.  L.  REV.  1655, 
1676–78 (2006); Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 1, 33–35 (2009) [hereinafter Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments]; Adrian Vermeule, The Par-
liament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2244–48 (2009) [hereinafter Vermeule, Parliament]; 
Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions 11–19 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-38, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1646414. 
  5  There are, of course, important exceptions to this general statement.  Indeed, a number of 
thoughtful contributions to the public law literature have noted ways in which legal and political 
institutions might influence government agents’ incentives to acquire information.  See, e.g., 
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, FIGHTING CRIME (forthcoming 2011); VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 57–
60; Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public 
Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2010); Darryl 
K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 361 (2004); William W. 
Buzbee, Adjudicatory Triggers of Enhanced Ambient Environment Information, 83 IND. L.J. 583, 
597–603 (2008); Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the United 
States: The Risks of Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION 135, 136 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental 
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of optimal legal-institutional design take as given (implicitly or explic-
itly) the expertise of the various possible decisionmakers.  Yet these 
agents often must exert costly efforts to obtain the evidence and to per-
form the analysis necessary to make better predictions about the con-
sequences of different courses of action, and their incentives to do so 
may be shaped by the institutional environment.  In the jargon of 
modern social science, public decisionmakers’ expertise about policy 
decisions is often endogenous (produced by factors internal to the le-
gal-institutional system) rather than exogenous (determined by factors 
external to, and therefore independent of, legal-institutional design 
choices). 
The endogeneity of government agents’ expertise may have pro-
found consequences for a range of institutional design questions.  As a 
general matter, agents’ private incentives to invest in research may not 
align with the social interest in their doing so.6  For this reason, insti-
tutional designers will often need to consider how to structure legal 
and institutional rules to promote not only the efficient aggregation 
and use of information, but also the efficient acquisition of informa-
tion.  Furthermore, there is often an unavoidable trade-off between in-
ducing optimal use of information ex post and inducing optimal acqui-
sition of information ex ante.  This trade-off arises because designers 
often have to try to achieve both of these tasks simultaneously, with a 
relatively limited and crude set of mechanisms.  Whenever one has to 
perform two tasks with one tool, it is likely that neither will be per-
formed perfectly; if one of those tasks is ignored, it may be performed 
very badly indeed.  Thus, failure to consider how legal institutions af-
fect incentives to acquire information may lead to incomplete or mis-
guided recommendations for institutional reform. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 120, 197–98 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, 
Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1509–13 (2008); Jacob E. 
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 212–14; Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 
890 (2009); O’Connell, supra note 4, at 1689–90; Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: 
Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 782–83 (1999); Benjamin K. Sova-
cool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on 
Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 424–25 (2008); Adrianne G. 
Threatt, The Impact of Term Limits on the Congressional Committee System, 6 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 767, 781–82 (1998); Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments, supra note 4, at 26–33; Vermeule, 
Parliament, supra note 4, at 2246–48; John Ferejohn, The Lure of Large Numbers, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1969, 1984–89 (2010) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 
(2009); and ADRIAN  VERMEULE,  LAW  AND  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON ( 2009)); Vermeule, 
Second Opinions, supra note 4, at 13–15.  This Article builds on these prior contributions in the 
legal literature, as well as the more extensive analyses of this topic found in the political economy 
literature. 
  6  For a succinct and insightful early summary of this problem, which despairs of finding any 
real solution, see Gordon Tullock, Public Decisions as Public Goods,  79 J.  POL.  ECON.  913 
(1971).    
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The goal of this Article is to move considerations of endogenous 
expertise from the periphery to the center of public law scholarship.  
In doing so, the Article sketches out how different institutional ar-
rangements (arrangements that are often determined or shaped by law) 
might affect the production of useful information by government 
agents.  In developing these points, the Article draws on an extensive 
body of literature in political economy and organization theory, a liter-
ature that has developed rapidly over the last two decades but that has 
not yet had much impact on legal scholarship.  Rather than providing 
a technically rigorous survey of this literature, the Article synthesizes 
some of its most important concepts and findings and discusses the 
implications that are of greatest relevance to public law.  The Article 
does not aspire to provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of any 
particular legal institution; the arguments and examples are deliberate-
ly general and abstract.  Their purpose is to supply a set of principles 
that could be brought to bear, in conjunction with other context-
specific considerations, in a range of applications. 
Part I lays out a stylized theoretical framework for thinking about 
the challenge of inducing public decisionmakers to acquire policy-
relevant information.  Parts II and III then consider how various insti-
tutional arrangements might affect public decisionmakers’ incentives 
to gather information.  Part II analyzes a simple setting involving a 
single principal and a single agent; Part III focuses on more complex 
settings involving multiple agents.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC  
UNDERINVESTMENT IN INFORMATION 
Most government decisions must be made under conditions of sub-
stantial uncertainty, in which the optimal choice depends on informa-
tion about consequences that can never be known with anything ap-
proaching certainty.  Consider the following stylized examples, based 
on familiar public policy controversies: 
•  The President must decide whether to authorize a set of aggres-
sive counterterrorism measures, including surveillance of elec-
tronic communications, coercive interrogation, and limits on the 
procedural rights of suspected terrorist detainees.  In some pos-
sible states of the world, such policies are, on balance, in socie-
ty’s interests, given the gravity of the threat and the efficacy of 
the measures in question.7  In other possible states of the world, 
the harm to civil liberties that these policies create outweighs 
their minimal security benefits; indeed, the policies might ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  7  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 21–26 
(2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 148–52 (2006).    
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tually undermine rather than aid the struggle against the terror-
ist threat.8 
•  Congress must vote on a health care reform bill.  Whether the 
bill is a good idea or a bad idea for the country (or, more paro-
chially, for each legislator’s constituency) depends on the legisla-
tion’s likely impact on health care costs, productivity, mortality 
and morbidity, inequality, and a host of other factors.  There are 
plausible scenarios in which the bill, if enacted, would make the 
country better off, but also plausible scenarios in which the bill 
would make the country worse off. 
•  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must decide how 
aggressively to respond to concerns about anthropogenic global 
climate change.  The appropriate regulatory response depends 
on the severity of the risk, the efficacy of various regulatory 
responses, and the economic costs of these measures — all top-
ics about which there is substantial uncertainty.9  In addition to 
this scientific and economic uncertainty, there may also be polit-
ical uncertainty: Will incremental administrative action prompt 
or inhibit a more comprehensive legislative response?10  Will 
unilateral national action facilitate or undermine the prospects 
for negotiating a more comprehensive global treaty?11 
•  The Supreme Court must decide whether a statute that places 
limits on certain forms of campaign spending contravenes the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech.  Although the question 
is framed as one of legal principle, the correct doctrinal answer 
depends on whether the government has a sufficiently compel-
ling interest in maintaining the law.12  This appraisal, in turn, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  8  See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1405, 1446 (2008); Nadine Strossen, American Exceptionalism, the War on Terror, and the Rule of 
Law in the Islamic World, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 498 (2009). 
  9  See, e.g., Eric Biber, Climate Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
975, 981–83 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty 31–41 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law & Le-
gal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1555343, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1555343. 
  10  See Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Mis-
guided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2008); cf. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (2007) (discussing how piecemeal adoption 
of state-level environmental laws may affect politics of adopting more comprehensive federal law). 
  11  See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National 
Climate Change Legislation, 28 Y ALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 247–49 (2010); John Holland, Note, 
The United States and Its Climate Change Policy: Advocating an Alignment of National Interest 
and Ethical Obligations, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 623, 642–44 (2009). 
  12  See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).  For general discussions of how the 
legal question of the strength of the government’s interest often has an important empirical and 
predictive dimension, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of 
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requires assessing the degree to which the restricted campaign 
activities increase the appearance or reality of political corrup-
tion, undermine confidence in democratic institutions, or cause 
other sufficiently severe social harms.13 
All of the public decisionmakers in these examples — the President, 
Congress, the EPA, and the Supreme Court — are faced with decisions 
under uncertainty.  While this sort of uncertainty is impossible to elim-
inate, all of these decisionmakers may have some capacity to acquire 
information about the likely consequences of different decisions.  For 
example, these agents (or their subordinates) may collect or analyze 
additional data, study the scholarly literature, consult with knowl-
edgeable outside parties, or perform a more systematic and compre-
hensive scenario analysis.  Even when such activities are not feasible 
or appropriate, a decisionmaker might be able to achieve more accu-
rate estimates of likely consequences by devoting more time, thought, 
and attention to the issues involved or by engaging in collective delib-
eration.  In some cases, a policymaker might implement a pilot pro-
gram that, while not itself cost justified, will generate useful empirical 
information that can then be used in the formulation of more general 
public policy.14  As shorthand, we can refer to all of the foregoing ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: 
An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988); 
Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75; and Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manip-
ulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2 (2008). 
  13  See, e.g., A USER’S GUIDE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Gerald C. Lubenow ed., 
2001); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Unrepresentative Information: The Case of Newspaper Report-
ing on Campaign Finance, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 213, 227–28 (2005); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., 
Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 105, 125–26; 
Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Pub-
lic Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2004); David M. 
Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 
5 ELECTION L.J. 23, 34–36 (2006); Beth Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures 
on Perceptions of Corruption, 8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 42–43 (2009). 
  14  See Amihai Glazer & Refael Hassin, Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs,  94 
PUB. CHOICE 105, 107–10 (1998); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 Y ALE 
L.J. 480, 491–95 (2008); cf. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, Policy Gambles, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1207 (2004) (modeling political incentives for government policy experimentation).  
Such information-gathering initiatives might also take the form of randomized experiments in 
which a range of policies (including some that are believed, ex ante, to be suboptimal) are imple-
mented for different (randomly selected) subgroups, in the hopes of generating more and better 
information.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law (Yale Law Sch. Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper No. 161,  2010),  available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_ 
papers/161; Esther Duflo et al., Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A 
Toolkit (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 138,  2006),  available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/faculty-working-papers/cid-working- 
paper-no.-138; D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, What Difference Representa-
tion? (Jan. 12,  2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1708664.  Experimental initiatives along these lines would qualify as “costly 
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tivities collectively as “research,” even though some of them might not 
resemble research in a conventional sense.15 
The main benefit of such research activities is that additional in-
formation may lead to better decisions.  Research, however, is costly: It 
requires a decisionmaker (or her staff) to devote time, resources, and 
mental effort to studying a particular issue rather than to something 
else.  Research may also entail delay — “paralysis by analysis” — that 
is costly as soon as it appears there is at least one alternative policy 
better than the status quo.  For these reasons, there is a limit both to 
how much research is socially desirable and to how much research one 
can expect a public decisionmaker to undertake.  We hope and expect 
that legislators will study the likely consequences of health care reform 
before voting on a bill; we do not hope, and should not expect, that 
legislators will spend all of their time, and the entirety of the gross 
domestic product, researching this issue.  We would like the EPA to 
devote substantial effort to studying the global climate change problem 
before deciding whether to adopt aggressive new restrictions on carbon 
dioxide emissions, but once we are sufficiently confident that some-
thing needs to be done, then after a certain point it is no longer 
worthwhile for the EPA to continue to study the issue in order to de-
velop an even better regulatory response.  As a general matter, we 
would like our public decisionmakers to invest in research up to the 
point where the marginal social benefit of additional research (in the 
form of improved policy decisions) is equal to the marginal social cost 
(typically the opportunity costs associated with the diversion of re-
sources and delay).16 
If government decisionmakers are (approximately) rational, we can 
expect that they will choose a level of research effort that (approx-
imately) equates their marginal benefits with their marginal costs.17  In 
many cases, however, the marginal social costs and benefits of research 
investment will not align perfectly with the relevant government 
agent’s private marginal costs and benefits.  Such misalignment leads 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
research” as this Article uses that term, as proceeding in this fashion entails costs (both the ex-
pected cost of implementing what appears to be a suboptimal policy with respect to some popula-
tions and the expected costs of implementing and monitoring the experiment), but might yield 
valuable information that could lead to more informed policy decisions in the future. 
  15  These examples, and most of the discussion in this Article, involve situations where research 
might reduce empirical uncertainty.  A similar logic would apply to moral or legal reasoning, if 
one postulates that the soundness of a decisionmaker’s moral or legal conclusion is positively cor-
related with the amount of effort the decisionmaker invests in considering the issue.  
  16  Of course, taking action does not preclude additional research; indeed, taking action will 
often be useful in generating further useful information.  See supra note 14.  The statement in the 
text is therefore a bit of an oversimplification, but the same basic logic would apply to more com-
plex decisions that involve ongoing revision and learning-by-doing. 
  17  See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management,  9 
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 39, 73 (1998).    
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to socially suboptimal investment in information.  Although it is theo-
retically possible for a public decisionmaker’s research effort to be too 
high or too low, there are reasons to think that in most cases it will be 
too low.  Most importantly, a typical government agent internalizes on-
ly a fraction of the aggregate social benefit associated with making a 
better public policy decision, but she internalizes the lion’s share of the 
research costs.  In contrast, although some of the costs associated with 
additional research are social costs, much of the research cost to the 
agent derives from things like forgone leisure, greater mental effort, 
and other private costs that are socially trivial.18  In his classic formu-
lation of this problem, Professor Gordon Tullock used the example of a 
judge deciding a case.  Tullock reasoned that, if the judge is con-
fronted with a difficult legal question, 
[h]e can produce a quick solution to the problem without much thought.  
If, however, he wants to be sure that he makes the “correct” decision, he 
must devote a great deal of time and thought to it.  This is a private cost, 
and the decision will primarily produce public goods.  Ordinary public-
goods reasoning would imply that he would underinvest in this private 
expenditure to obtain the public good of a superior decision.19 
This problem is likely to exist even when the relevant agents are dedi-
cated public servants who care deeply about making good decisions.  
As a relative matter, the cumulative social utility from making even a 
slightly better decision on a matter like health care, climate change, 
counterterrorism, or campaign finance likely dwarfs the private utility 
that accrues to the responsible decisionmaker.20  An additional reason 
why pre-decision research investment is likely to be too low (explored 
in greater detail in Part III) is that when multiple agents are responsi-
ble for researching a policy decision, the acquisition of policy-relevant 
information may be subject to a collective action problem. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  18  Furthermore, research activities compete for time and attention with an agent’s other tasks, 
and many forms of research may be less rewarding to the agent, as a relative matter, than these 
other tasks, even if the social value of research is large.  See Eric Biber, Environmental Law’s 
Monitoring Problem (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 1680000, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680000. 
  19  Tullock, supra note 6, at 915 (footnote omitted). 
  20  See id.  In this issue, Professor Michael Abramowicz proffers the intriguing suggestion that 
it might be possible to allow innovative policymakers to internalize more of the benefits of their 
innovations by, for example, granting a state government that implements a successful new pro-
gram “exclusive rights” to that policy innovation, and perhaps requiring other states wishing to 
follow the model to pay a “licensing fee.”  See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: 
Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (2011).  Abramowicz, how-
ever, does not flesh out this possibility (which is peripheral to the main point of his article), and it 
would seem to face formidable practical difficulties.  The more general idea of leveraging compe-
tition among different policymaking entities (for example, states) is explored in section III.C, pp. 
1479–82.    
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Thus, a government agent’s private marginal benefit from addi-
tional research may often be systematically lower than the social mar-
ginal benefit of such research, or the agent’s private marginal research 
cost may be systematically higher than the social marginal cost of that 
research.21  If this principal-agent problem is a real and serious one — 
one that leads to systematically worse decisions of law and policy than 
we would prefer — what might we do about it?  The natural answer is 
to find ways to reduce the relevant government agents’ marginal re-
search costs, to increase their marginal research benefits, or both. 
The most straightforward way a social planner could try to align 
an agent’s private marginal research costs and benefits with social 
marginal costs and benefits would be to offer the agent some form of 
compensation (such as a higher wage) for performing additional re-
search (or for making a higher-quality decision).  Alternatively, one 
could threaten the agent with some kind of direct punishment (a fine 
or termination of employment) if the agent invests too little in research 
or if the final outcome is adjudged a failure.  Indeed, much of the ex-
isting economics literature on the analogous problem in the private 
firm context focuses on this sort of contingent compensation mechan-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  21  Although this Article focuses on the problem of systematic underinvestment in information, 
which is likely to be more prevalent for the reasons sketched in the text, see supra pp. 1430–31, a 
structurally similar problem may lead to systematic overinvestment in information.  This latter 
problem may take the form of the “paralysis by analysis” problem noted earlier, see supra p. 1430, 
in which extra study is socially costly because it preserves a socially inefficient status quo for a 
longer time.  Even if there is no delay problem, there may be situations in which a government 
agent diverts too many resources from other socially useful tasks in order to research a particular 
problem.  One would expect to observe this sort of overinvestment when the government agent’s 
private marginal benefit of doing additional research is higher than the marginal social benefit (as 
when the agent has an excessive stake in the success of one particular project) or when the agent’s 
private marginal cost of research is lower than the marginal social cost (as when the agent pays 
for additional research by diverting resources from activities that are more valuable to society 
than to the agent).  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous 
Agency Expertise 18–19 (Harvard Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Pa-
per No. 553, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921439. 
   Furthermore, if decisionmakers suffer from certain forms of cognitive bias, acquisition of 
more information may actually worsen decisionmaking by, for example, fostering overconfidence 
in potentially false beliefs.  See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2105–08 (1979); Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Mat-
ter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. ECON. 37, 38–39 (1999); see also Edward L. Glaeser 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 263–64 (2009) 
(arguing that deliberation can sometimes cause group polarization, which can lead to more rather 
than fewer erroneous decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Delibera-
tion, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004–06 (2005) (same). 
    In settings where overinvestment in information is the principal concern, the analysis in the 
remainder of this Article would still be relevant, but the normative conclusions would be inverted, 
as the social objective in this mirror-image case would be to reduce, rather than increase, research 
incentives.    
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ism.22  Even in contexts where literal contracts are not available — 
such as the relationship between politicians and voters — scholars 
have suggested that something like this mechanism (in particular, the 
threat of ex post punishment for policy failure) may help redress the 
inherent agency problem in political representation.23  This same basic 
logic might induce political agents to acquire more and better informa-
tion before taking risky action. 
There are, however, several difficulties with this solution in the 
context of public decisionmaking.  First, it is often impossible for the 
principal to observe (or to infer with sufficient accuracy) how much a 
given agent has invested in research, and it is often similarly difficult 
to observe the quality of a policy decision after the fact, especially for 
policies that have long-term consequences.24  Second, it may be diffi-
cult for the principal to credibly commit to follow through on its prom-
ise to pay a bonus for acquiring information or to impose a penalty for 
failing to do so.  This problem is exacerbated by the difficulty of ob-
serving research effort and the quality of policy outcomes, which 
makes it more difficult to assess whether the principal has reneged.  
Third, if the principal is society in general, it may be infeasible for so-
ciety, acting collectively, to agree to an employment contract with gov-
ernment officials that implements this sort of refined incentive scheme.  
Fourth, established features of our current public institutions — in-
cluding the rules for compensating judges, civil servants, and senior 
legislative and executive officials — may constrain our ability to offer 
these sorts of contingent rewards.25  Although these institutional rules 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  See generally, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 
(2005); BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS (1997).  For specific applica-
tions of this optimal contracting approach to investment in information (as opposed to other forms 
of effort), see, for example, Tim S. Campbell et al., Incentives for Information Production and 
Optimal Job Assignment with Human Capital Considerations, 60 ECONOMICA 13 (1993); Joel S. 
Demski & David E.M. Sappington, Delegated Expertise,  25 J.  ACCT.  RES.  68 ( 1987); Joel S. 
Demski & David E.M. Sappington, Hierarchical Regulatory Control,  18 RAND  J.  ECON. 369 
(1987); Richard A. Lambert, Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects, 17 RAND J. ECON. 
77 (1986); Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, Information Management in Incentive Prob-
lems, 105 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1997); Todd T. Milbourn et al., Managerial Career Concerns and 
Investments in Information, 32 RAND J. ECON. 334 (2001); and Dezsö Szalay, Contracts with 
Endogenous Information, 65 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 586 (2009). 
  23  See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks, Electoral Accountability and Incumbency,  in 
MODELS  OF  STRATEGIC  CHOICE  IN  POLITICS  121,  123–24 (P et e r C . O rde sh ook  e d . , 1989); 
John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,  50 P UB.  CHOICE  5,  7 ( 1986); 
Adam Meirowitz, Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy 
Constraints, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 41, 42–43 (2007); Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 3, at 
627–36; Matthew C. Stephenson & Jide O. Nzelibe, Political Accountability Under Alternative 
Institutional Regimes, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 139, 143 (2010). 
  24  See Canice Prendergast, A Theory of “Yes Men,” 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 757–58 (1993). 
  25  See Dezsö Szalay, The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options, 72 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 1173, 1173 (2005).    
1434  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 124:1422 
are themselves changeable, they may be costly to change and may 
serve other desirable functions, and so they might have to be treated as 
exogenous constraints.  For these and other reasons, a contingent com-
pensation contract may not work all that well for a range of important 
public decisionmaking contexts, and this Article will put this sort of 
mechanism to one side. 
If contingent compensation contracts are not available, a principal 
might nonetheless decrease an agent’s marginal research cost simply 
by supplying the agent with more resources (for example, a higher 
budget or more staff).  Doing so will tend to increase the resources that 
the agent is willing to allocate across a range of tasks, including re-
search.26  H o w e v e r ,  s i m p l y  i n c r e a s i n g  resources is unlikely to be a 
complete solution to the problem.  Providing any given agent with 
more resources is both socially costly and constrained by other political 
or institutional factors.  In addition, resources alone do not address the 
problem of incentive misalignment; indeed, while providing more re-
sources will increase investment in socially valuable activities, such as 
research, some of these resources will be diverted to activities with 
lower social value but greater private value to the agent.27  It is there-
fore unlikely that increasing resources, even if socially desirable, would 
entirely solve the underinvestment problem. 
Another way that an institutional designer might increase a gov-
ernment agent’s marginal research benefit, or reduce her marginal re-
search cost, is through the selection of agents.  Indeed, perhaps the 
most obvious way to foster a more expert government is to staff the 
government with smarter people.28  Additionally, a principal can try to 
select “public-spirited” agents who care intensely about policy out-
comes, as such agents’ private marginal benefit from additional re-
search will tend to be higher. 
The above observations are familiar (though they are not always 
framed in the context of incentivizing the acquisition of information) 
and so this Article will not pursue them further, except to note that at-
tempting to use selection to redress the problem of underinvestment in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  See, e.g., Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications for Bureaucratic 
Policy-Making, 106 PUB. CHOICE 243, 245 (2001).  For example, some evidence indicates that 
sizeable increases in law enforcement budgets in the early 1970s and again in the early 1990s led 
to greater increases in prosecutions than in arrests, which is at least suggestive evidence that larg-
er budgets led to more information gathering, which in turn led to higher-quality law enforce-
ment.  See STUNTZ, supra note 5. 
  27  See Ting, supra note 26, at 243–44. 
  28  “Smart” here is a casual way to characterize agents with low marginal research costs.  Of 
course, an agent’s marginal research cost is only one aspect of an agent’s qualifications and must 
be balanced against others.  See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Qualifications: Law and Practice of Se-
lecting Agency Leaders 3, 20–22 (Jan. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library).    
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research may present some difficult trade-offs.  First, the most public-
spirited agents may not always be the smartest, and vice versa.  Even 
if one is focused narrowly on incentivizing research, it is important to 
keep in mind that the most important consideration is the ratio of 
marginal research costs to marginal research benefits; considering ei-
ther in isolation may be misleading.  Second, there is the well-known 
trade-off between competence and loyalty — a trade-off the Chinese 
Communists colorfully described as the “red-versus-expert” problem.29  
Often the agent with the lowest marginal research costs also has pref-
erences that differ substantially from the principal’s, while the agent 
with policy preferences most similar to the principal’s faces relatively 
high marginal research costs. 
The analysis in Parts II and III focuses on how legal and institu-
tional rules can affect government agents’ incentives to invest in ex-
pertise through mechanisms other than contingent performance con-
tracts and selection mechanisms.  The Article also brackets the 
potentially important role of institutional reforms that improve the 
overall efficiency of government, thereby lowering the marginal re-
search costs.30  The remainder of the analysis will treat each govern-
ment agent’s marginal research costs as fixed, focusing instead on how 
different legal and institutional design choices might affect a govern-
ment agent’s research incentives through their effects on the agent’s 
marginal research benefit. 
It is analytically useful to decompose the agent’s marginal research 
benefit into two components, each of which corresponds to a question 
that a rational agent would ask herself at the moment she must decide 
whether to invest an additional unit of effort in attempting to acquire 
decision-relevant information. 
First, the agent will assess her expected utility if she does not ac-
quire additional information.  That is, she will ask herself: “If I don’t 
invest in trying to learn anything else, what will the final decision be, 
and what is my expected utility from that decision?”  Call this the 
agent’s (expected) “default payoff.”  The default payoff may be the 
known or expected payoff from a particular decision, or it may reflect 
the agent’s subjective beliefs about the probability of different out-
comes if the agent does not do any additional research. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  29  See Martin K. Whyte, “Red vs. Expert”: Peking’s Changing Policy, PROBS. COMMUNISM, 
Nov.–Dec. 1972, at 18, 18. 
  30  For example, this Article does not deal with mechanisms like petition systems, private rights 
of action, prediction markets, or other tools that might lower the costs to government agencies of 
gathering widely dispersed information.  See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY 162–
93 (2007) (prediction markets); Biber & Brosi, supra note 5, at 327–31  (petition systems); Stephen-
son, supra note 2, at 98–121 (private rights of action).  The Article’s analysis would, however, ap-
ply to the government’s decision to create such systems in the first place, as such a decision might 
itself turn on costly information about its likely effects on the quality of future public decisions.    
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Second, the agent will estimate her expected utility if she does in-
vest the additional unit of effort in research.  In other words, the agent 
will ask herself: “If I invest in research, what will my expected utility 
be from the (possibly) better-informed decision that will result?”  Call 
this the agent’s (expected) “research payoff.”  An agent’s calculation of 
her research payoff entails her making subjective probability assess-
ments of what she might learn from additional research, as well as 
what policy consequences would flow from different possible pieces of 
new information.31 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  This formulation posits that government decisionmakers maximize their subjective expected 
utility (SEU): given their personal subjective (and perhaps implicit or subconscious) beliefs about 
the probabilities of different outcomes (which may not be correct), agents will act to maximize 
their expected utility, given their values.  See LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS  OF 
STATISTICS 6–9 (1954).  This is a standard axiom in most modern political economy.  That said, 
there are a number of objections to the SEU framework.  While a full treatment of these issues is 
well beyond the scope of this Article, two are particularly pertinent to the application of SEU 
theory to investment in information. 
   First, some economists, following the work of Professor Frank Knight, have suggested a 
distinction between “risk” (situations in which different possible outcomes can be assigned numer-
ical probabilities a priori) and “uncertainty” (situations in which even the probabilities of different 
outcomes are themselves unknown).  See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY 
AND PROFIT 197–203 (1921).  In one interpretation of Knight’s distinction, agents cannot act as 
SEU maximizers under conditions of uncertainty, because it is impossible for them to calculate the 
probabilities of different outcomes (or even to identify what those outcomes are); they must use 
some other decision procedure.  One might assert that government agents trying to decide how 
much to invest in research face a situation of uncertainty rather than risk.  This is especially so if 
the range of possible policy choices is unknown ex ante, such that research might uncover entirely 
new options that the decisionmaker does not even know about when she makes her research deci-
sion. 
   However, while it is often true that one cannot confidently assign precise probability esti-
mates to particular outcomes on the basis of objective a priori or statistical considerations, SEU 
theory does not require that sort of precision; it requires only that agents behave as if they as-
signed probability distributions over outcomes.  See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 
282 (1976).  (Indeed, Professors Stephen LeRoy and Larry Singell have persuasively argued that 
Knight himself never intended his concept of uncertainty to entail a rejection of subjective proba-
bility, but rather meant to characterize settings in which insurance markets cannot function due to 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  See Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. Singell, Jr., 
Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 95 J. POL. ECON. 394, 394–96 (1987).)  Admittedly, an impor-
tant body of empirical evidence indicates that the SEU assumption is sometimes violated — in 
particular, that individuals exhibit “uncertainty” or “ambiguity” aversion, in addition to risk aver-
sion.  See, e.g., Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 643 
(1961).  But recent work has suggested that ambiguity avoidance may in fact be consistent with 
SEU theory if agents can take unobservable actions that affect the probabilities of different out-
comes.  See David Kelsey & Frank Milne, Induced Preferences, Nonadditive Beliefs, and Multiple 
Priors, 40 INT’L ECON. REV. 455, 457 (1999).  Moreover, although genuine ambiguity aversion 
would imply a higher level of research investment than SEU theory would predict (all else equal), 
it would likely not affect the comparative statics predicted by SEU theory.  That said, for readers 
who find the risk-uncertainty distinction compelling and who doubt that agents can act as SEU 
maximizers under conditions of pure uncertainty, it is worth emphasizing that many government 
decisions of interest do involve conditions of risk (or a mix of risk and uncertainty).  Thus, the 
Knightian objection would at most limit the scope of the analysis developed in this Article. 
    
2011]  INFORMATION ACQUISITION  1437 
The agent’s marginal research benefit from investing an additional 
unit of effort in research is simply the difference between the research 
payoff and the default payoff.  Thus, the strength of the agent’s re-
search incentive is a decreasing function of her default payoff and an 
increasing function of her research payoff.  That conclusion is both 
quite straightforward — perhaps obvious — and quite abstract.  The 
balance of this Article seeks to flesh out this simple observation by ex-
ploring how a range of institutional design choices are likely to affect 
an agent’s default payoff and research payoff.  Although these institu-
tional structures are presented in stylized form, they correspond to fa-
miliar features of real-world decisionmaking structures used by legisla-
tures, courts, and executive branch agencies and officials. 
Before proceeding, however, it is worth pausing to consider a po-
tential objection to the whole enterprise.  The analysis in this Article 
presumes that both the principal and the agent care about information, 
in the sense that it is possible that new information, acquired via costly 
research effort, might alter their (induced) policy preferences.  Yet 
there may be many issues — possibly including a number of the high-
profile political issues discussed above — for which additional infor-
mation is unlikely to change actors’ minds (except perhaps by intensi-
fying their prior beliefs).32  This observation is unlikely to be true for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
    Second, a related concern, more specific to the context of information gathering, is a kind of 
infinite regress problem: deciding how much to invest in research requires assessing the costs and 
benefits of an additional unit of research, but these costs and benefits are themselves uncertain; 
the agent may learn more about the potential value of research (the range of possible results, the 
likely costs, and so forth), but learning this information is also costly; this fact implies that the 
agent must make a decision regarding how much to invest in researching how much to research; 
this second-order research problem raises the same issue; and so on.  See John Conlisk, Why 
Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 686–88 (1996); Barton L. Lipman, How to 
Decide How to Decide How to . . .: Modeling Limited Rationality, 59 E CONOMETRICA 1105, 
1106 (1991); Wiener, supra note 17, at 73–74.  While this infinite regress problem has important 
philosophical and technical ramifications, it is not a serious difficulty with the analysis in this Ar-
ticle.  The suggestion that the infinite regress problem means that it is impossible for an agent to 
optimize, see, e.g., id. at 74, is not necessarily true; under some reasonable assumptions, one can 
still characterize an agent’s behavior as the solution to an optimization problem, despite the re-
gress, see generally Lipman, supra. 
   Moreover, despite the conceptual challenge posed by the infinite regress problem, from a 
practical modeling standpoint it makes sense to bracket the infinite regression and to consider 
only one research decision and the final decision.  This approach would be equivalent to assuming 
that the agent’s information at the decision stage is endogenous (determined at the research stage), 
but her information at the prior research stage is exogenous.  That is a plausible simplifying as-
sumption to make for an applied analysis, and one that corresponds to much observed behavior.  
See Conlisk, supra, at 688. 
  32  See, e.g., Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 272–73; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Y ALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 156 (2006); Dan M. Kahan 
& Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1317–18 (2003); Rabin & Schrag, supra note 21, at 41–47; James Andreo-
ni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, Diverging Opinions 26–27 (May 7, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library).    
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all issues, however.  Moreover, this Article’s analysis would still be per-
tinent so long as the relevant decisionmakers cared somewhat about 
additional information; the analysis assumes neither that decisionmak-
ers process information optimally nor that they lack strong prior policy 
views.  There may be a subset of cases in which actors’ preferences 
truly are insensitive to additional information.  Such cases are analyti-
cally equivalent to the setting in which all decision-relevant informa-
tion is exogenous rather than endogenous.  In such settings the consid-
erations in this Article would not apply.33  But as long as it is possible, 
at least under some circumstances, for better information to lead to 
different (and better) policy decisions, then the analysis laid out in the 
balance of this Article will be relevant. 
II.  RESEARCH INCENTIVES OF A SINGLE AGENT 
In exploring the myriad ways that legal and institutional structures 
may affect public decisionmakers’ research incentives, it is helpful to 
begin with a simple setting involving a single principal and a single 
agent.  The principal might be a particular institution, such as a legis-
lative assembly, a chief executive, or an appellate court, with the agent 
a delegate or subordinate of that institution, such as a legislative com-
mittee, an administrative agency, or a trial court.  Alternatively, one 
could think of the principal as society in general and of the agent as a 
government body that is supposed to serve the public interest.34  The 
following discussion explores how the principal’s institutional design 
choices can have a powerful effect on the agent’s incentives to acquire 
information and how recognition of this fact may alter conventional 
conclusions about optimal institutional design.  Part II focuses on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  33  Perhaps, as noted earlier, there are also cases where an actor’s information-processing abili-
ty is not only imperfect, but so distorted that additional information actually worsens the quality 
of her decisions (from her own perspective), even though the actor herself does not realize it.  See 
supra note 21.  Again, in such cases this Article’s analysis would still be relevant, but the norma-
tive conclusions would be reversed, since the social objective would be to reduce rather than in-
crease the agent’s research investment. 
  34  Although the positive analysis developed in this Article applies even if the “principal” is a 
real-world government agent or institution, rather than “society,” it is important to emphasize that 
a normative evaluation of different “solutions” to the principal-agent problem described below 
may depend critically on an assessment of whether the principal’s inability to control the agent is 
in fact a problem.  Under some circumstances — in particular, those where the principal has (or 
may have) the wrong preferences from a social point of view — one may not want to make the 
agent more responsive to the principal’s interest.  Cf. Stephenson, supra note 3, at 55 (developing a 
model in which constraining the ability of an elected political leader to control subordinates is 
socially optimal).  Normative interpretations of the positive results discussed below must be sensi-
tive to this consideration.  Although this Article is motivated by underlying normative concerns 
about government performance, the principal objective is to elucidate how various institutional 
mechanisms might influence an agent’s incentive to invest in research — a positive, rather than 
normative, inquiry.     
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incentive effects of three familiar ways in which institutional designers 
use legal and other mechanisms to shape decisionmaking by public 
agents: ex ante substantive and procedural constraints on the agent’s 
discretionary authority, evidentiary standards and requirements, and 
ex post review of the agent’s policy choices.35 
A.  Ex Ante Substantive and Procedural Constraints 
Often, government authorities and institutional designers delegate 
authority to an agent but at the same time set up a structure that con-
strains and channels how the agent exercises her discretion.  This con-
trol strategy — which seeks to make use of the agent’s policy expertise 
while mitigating concerns about the agent’s policy bias — is particu-
larly relevant to public law, which is sometimes thought to be one of 
the principal mechanisms that implement these ex ante control struc-
tures.36  For example, constitutional rules are thought to both establish 
and constrain the discretion of the various branches of government.  
Likewise, statutes that delegate to other agents — such as administra-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  35  While the discussion within each section provisionally assumes that a particular institution-
al design choice is feasible, in some contexts some of those choices might not be feasible.  For this 
reason, the discussions in each of the sections are, for the most part, self-contained. Each section 
notes, where appropriate, the assumptions being made about the sorts of mechanisms that the 
principal is and is not able to employ.  Sometimes the discussion explicitly notes which of two 
possible control strategies is better for the principal, if both are available, but outside these specif-
ic instances the analysis makes no general claims about which mechanisms are superior. 
  36  See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L.  ECON. &  ORG.  101, 103–05 (1997); Mathew D. 
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 243, 246–48 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. 
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and 
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440–44 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., 
Structure and Process]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agen-
cy Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1248–50 (1989); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the 
Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 479–87 
(1999); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1699–1701 (1975). 
    It is worth observing that a system that imposes ex ante constraints on an agent’s discretion 
often requires the principal to make a credible commitment to these institutions.  Such precom-
mitment, however, is problematic: if the principal has an ex post incentive to allow an agent to 
make an ostensibly prohibited decision or to block a supposedly permitted choice, then it is un-
clear how the system of ex ante constraints is enforceable.  Nonetheless, commitment appears to 
be possible at least some of the time, even in settings without an outside enforcer.  See Nzelibe & 
Stephenson, supra note 3, at 648–49; Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commit-
ment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126, 146–50 (1992); cf. Daniel Diermei-
er,  Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions,  89 A M.  POL.  SCI.  REV.  344,  344–45 
(1995) (discussing the control of committee specialization exercised by the legislative floor majori-
ty despite a commitment problem).  The assumption that precommitment is possible would, of 
course, eliminate one of the reasons why the principal could not use the more efficient mechanism 
of paying the agent directly for doing research, but other factors might continue to make such di-
rect contingent compensation arrangements infeasible.  See supra pp. 1433–34.    
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tive agencies or courts — often contain substantive or procedural re-
strictions that are designed to limit or condition the agents’ autonomy. 
The simplest form that this sort of ex ante control strategy may 
take is the advance specification, by the principal, of the set of actions 
that an agent is allowed to select and the corresponding set of prohib-
ited actions.  The principal, in other words, may use legal rules to es-
tablish the agent’s “discretionary window.”37  When deciding how 
much discretion to delegate (that is, the size and location of the discre-
tionary window), the principal must weigh the potential informational 
gains of delegation against the costs associated with potential agency 
bias.  The extensive literature on this basic delegation problem has 
generated a number of important (if straightforward) hypotheses.  The 
first is that a principal is willing to delegate more discretion to an 
agent with expected policy preferences similar to the principal’s own 
— a hypothesis sometimes referred to as the “ally principle.”38  A natu-
ral corollary is that if the principal has the power to influence the 
agent’s policy preferences, the principal will select an agent with pref-
erences closer to the principal’s own.  A related corollary is that if the 
principal is not able to select a perfect ally as its agent, it will locate 
the discretionary window to (partially) offset the agent’s predicted bias. 
A second prominent hypothesis — sometimes dubbed the “uncer-
tainty principle” — is that a principal will delegate more discretion to 
the agent (that is, it will expand the size of the discretionary window) 
when the link between policies and outcomes is less certain ex ante.39  
This uncertainty principle may be thought of as a special case of a 
more general “expertise principle,” according to which the principal’s 
willingness to delegate increases as the agent’s expected informational 
advantage increases.40  This hypothesis fits comfortably with one of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  37  See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 60 (1999); Sean 
Gailmard, Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy 
Making, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 25, 25–42 (2009); Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zeal-
ots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 882–84 
(2007).  This research builds on the seminal model developed by Bengt Holmström in the general 
context of organizational design.  See Bengt Holmström, On the Theory of Delegation, in BAYES-
IAN MODELS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 115 (Marcel Boyer & Richard E. Kihlstrom eds., 1984). 
  38  See Jonathan Bendor et al., Theories of Delegation, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235, 236 (2001); 
Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 
293 (2004); Frederick J. Boehmke et al., Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue 
Choice in Policy-Making, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 139, 140–41 (2005); John D. Huber & Charles R. Shi-
pan,  Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy,  in T HE  OXFORD  HANDBOOK  OF  POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 256, 260 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006). 
  39  See Bendor et al., supra note 38, at 242, 248; Bendor & Meirowitz, supra note 38, at 293; 
Huber & Shipan, supra note 38, at 260. 
  40  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK  ON  PUBLIC  CHOICE  AND  PUBLIC  LAW  285,  288 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell eds., 2010).  The underlying logic of the expertise principle is that delegation is more 
attractive when the agent has better information about the connection between policy and out-
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the classic explanations (and justifications) for the growth of the ad-
ministrative state: the bureaucracy’s superior expertise, especially on 
complex technical matters, is a key factor that leads Congress to dele-
gate broad authority to agencies.41 
The specification of a discretionary window is a relatively crude 
control strategy, as it entails delegating unconstrained discretion within 
a range and totally prohibiting anything outside that range.  A prin-
cipal might employ a more nuanced version of essentially the same 
control strategy by establishing a system of variable rewards and pe-
nalties that makes some policy choices relatively more or less attrac-
tive.42  For example, the legislature might empower an agency to set a 
regulatory standard, but impose procedural requirements that make 
increasing the stringency of the regulatory standard progressively more 
difficult (and therefore more costly) for the agency.43  The legislature 
might achieve a similar result by subjecting the agency’s decision to 
review by a third-party overseer who demands increasingly onerous 
and costly justifications as the agency’s proposed policy deviates fur-
ther from the status quo (or some favored policy specified by the prin-
cipal).44  Or the legislature might make additional resources available 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
comes.  The agent’s expertise advantage will increase as the principal becomes more uncertain 
about the likely effects of different policies, holding the agency’s (un)certainty fixed; this is the 
traditional uncertainty principle modeled in much of the early literature on the political economy 
of delegation.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 37, at 17–18.  Likewise, the attrac-
tiveness of delegation increases if one holds the principal’s uncertainty about the connection be-
tween policies and outcomes fixed but increases the agent’s certainty about this connection.  Be-
cause what matters is the relative certainty of the principal and the agent about the policy-
outcome connection (which one can think of as their relative “expertise”), rather than some gener-
al level of uncertainty as such, the expertise principle seems a more accurate characterization of 
the basic argument. 
  41  See generally J AMES  M.  LANDIS,  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  PROCESS  (1938); David B. 
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000). 
  42  See Gailmard, supra note 37, at 26–28; Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision 
Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 469–73 (2007); Stephenson, 
supra note 12, at 4. 
  43  See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 36, at 248–53; McCubbins et 
al., Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 431; David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: 
Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 417–18 (1999); Emerson H. 
Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Mak-
ing, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114, 119–24 (1998); cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substi-
tution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 553–57 (2006) (arguing that courts are likely to be more 
deferential to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations when the agencies have employed 
costly formal procedures). 
  44  See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006); Stephenson, supra note 12; Stephenson, supra note 43; cf. Ethan Bu-
eno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight, 101 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605 (2007) (discussing oversight of agencies by courts, the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs, and other institutions).    
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to the agency only if the agency chooses certain actions.45  One might 
classify these approaches collectively as the manipulation, by the prin-
cipal, of the agent’s relative “enactment costs” for different policies.46 
This more nuanced “enactment cost manipulation” strategy (also 
sometimes referred to as the use of a “menu law”47) is always at least 
as good for the principal as is fixing a discretionary window, and 
usually better.48  Of course, this approach may not always be possible: 
it may be more difficult to establish and enforce variable rewards and 
penalties than it is simply to set a range of permissible choices.  But if 
the variable enactment cost approach is feasible, then the principal 
could conceivably eliminate (or at least substantially mitigate) the 
agency problem by using these rewards and punishments to align the 
agent’s policy preferences with the principal’s own. 
While both of these control strategies have attracted a great deal of 
scholarly attention (both in general and in particular applications), 
most of the extant scholarship, particularly in the legal literature, op-
erates under the implicit assumption that the relevant agents’ informa-
tional endowments are exogenous.  Yet both of these forms of ex ante 
control may affect an agent’s incentive to gather costly information.  
Taking the endogeneity of information into account both complicates 
the standard hypotheses concerning the optimal design of ex ante con-
trol systems and suggests alternative strategies for inducing better-
informed public policy decisions. 
Imposing substantive or procedural constraints on the scope of an 
agent’s policy discretion may affect the agent’s research incentives in 
two ways: 
First, these constraints may affect the agent’s default payoff, there-
by strengthening the agent’s research incentives.  The simplest way to 
illustrate this phenomenon is by considering a simple version of the 
discretionary window strategy in which the principal and the agent 
have identical policy preferences.  In such a case, the standard ally 
principle would imply that the principal would prefer to delegate the 
agent unconstrained discretion.  But suppose the principal were to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  45  See Gailmard, supra note 37; cf. David P. Baron, Legislative Organization with Information-
al Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 485, 487 (2000) (discussing a similar control strategy in the 
context of a legislative chamber overseeing a committee). 
  46  See Stephenson, supra note 42, at 469; Stephenson, supra note 12, at 2; see also Gersen, su-
pra note 4, at 248; Gersen, supra note 3, at 302; John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of 
International Delegation, 118 Y ALE L.J. 1712, 1715 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemp-
tion, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 877 (2008). 
  47  See Gailmard, supra note 37, at 26.  
  48  See id.  Indeed, the discretionary window approach can be thought of as simply a special 
case of the enactment cost approach in which the enactment cost of any policy within the window 
is zero and the enactment cost of any policy outside the window is so large that the agent would 
never select it.  See id.    
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prohibit the agent from choosing the policy that the agent (and the 
principal) would prefer ex ante.  Doing so would lower the agent’s de-
fault payoff, which tends to increase the agent’s incentive to do re-
search.49  For instance, if a jury has to choose between convicting a 
defendant of a serious felony and letting him go, the jury may deliber-
ate much more intensively than would be the case if the jury had the 
option to convict the defendant of a lesser offense that carried a lighter 
sentence.50  Likewise, if a regulator must choose between banning a 
potentially hazardous product and leaving it unregulated, the regulator 
has a stronger incentive to accurately estimate the true dangers of the 
product than would be the case if the regulator could adopt some in-
termediate regulatory standard, such as a licensing regime.  As the 
principal further restricts the agent’s choice set by eliminating, say, the 
agent’s second-, third-, and fourth-most-preferred policies ex ante, the 
agent’s default payoff worsens further, and the agent’s incentive to do 
research grows stronger.51  A similar logic applies in contexts where 
the principal can manipulate the agent’s enactment costs: raising the 
relative costs of the agent’s ex ante preferred option lowers the agent’s 
default payoff relative to her informed payoff, and this effect in turn 
stimulates greater research effort.52 
Thus, one important — and perhaps surprising — general principle 
regarding the optimal structure of delegated authority is that when in-
formation is endogenous the principal may prefer to prohibit, or make 
relatively less desirable, those policy choices that the agent would be 
most inclined to favor ex ante, even if the agent’s preferences are close-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  49  See Szalay, supra note 25, at 1174.  Of course, eliminating the ex ante preferred option also 
reduces the agent’s research payoff, in that research might show that the best course of action is 
indeed the one that the agent preferred ex ante.  But in many plausible decision settings, the eli-
mination of the ex ante preferred option will reduce the agent’s default payoff by more than it 
reduces her research payoff.  This outcome is especially likely when the ex ante preferred option is 
in fact unlikely to be the true optimum, but is instead a “compromise” option located between 
more extreme choices that might be very good or very bad.  See id.  It is, however, possible to 
construct cases in which elimination of the agent’s ex ante preferred option actually weakens re-
search incentives by reducing the agent’s research payoff more than it reduces the agent’s default 
payoff. 
  50  The Supreme Court, however, has held that putting a jury to such a choice is unconstitu-
tional, at least in capital contexts.  See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980).  The example 
in the text is not meant in any way as a critique of Beck or as an endorsement of the strategy of 
putting a jury to this sort of choice.  It is merely a way to illustrate the intuition that when one is 
forced into an unhappy choice between extremes, one may think harder about the choice than 
would be the case if an attractive “moderate” or “compromise” option were readily available. 
  51  See Szalay, supra note 25, at 1174.  Of course, as the principal rules out additional possible 
policy choices beyond the agent’s ex ante most-preferred choice, the agent’s research payoff also 
decreases, which tends to weaken the agent’s research incentives.  See supra note 49.  Even if the 
effect on the agent’s default payoff is larger initially, past a certain point the net effect will re-
verse. 
  52  See Stephenson, supra note 42, at 470.    
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ly aligned with those of the principal.  Of course, an institutional de-
sign strategy that rules out the ex ante preferred option may have se-
rious disadvantages: the ex ante preferred option (for example, convic-
tion on the lesser offense, enactment of the licensing regime) may turn 
out to be the most desirable choice even after the agency has invested 
optimally in information (either because the agency’s research efforts 
are unsuccessful or because the agency learns that the ex ante pre-
ferred option, or something close to it, is indeed the best policy to 
adopt).  Nonetheless, it is possible that these ex post losses will be 
outweighed by the informational gain induced by restricting the agen-
cy’s discretion. 
Second, ex ante substantive and procedural constraints on an 
agent’s discretion may also alter the agent’s research payoff.  Imagine, 
for example, that the principal narrows the scope of the agent’s discre-
tion, such that certain policy options are not available even if the agent 
learns information that would cause the agent to prefer those options.  
This change reduces the agent’s research payoff, because narrowing 
the agent’s discretion means that she may learn information that she 
cannot use (because she is legally barred from taking the action im-
plied by that information).  All else equal, this reduction in the agent’s 
research payoff tends to decrease her incentive to do costly research.53  
Likewise, if the principal raises the relative enactment costs of policies 
other than the agent’s ex ante preferred policy, then the agent’s re-
search payoff decreases and the agent’s research incentive weakens.54  
In contrast, if the principal expands the agent’s freedom to choose pol-
icies that seem ex ante undesirable — but that the agent might prefer 
given sufficient evidence — then the agent’s research incentives be-
come stronger.  Similarly, if the principal lowers the relative enactment 
costs of policies other than the agent’s ex ante preferred policy, the 
agent has a greater incentive to do research, as such research is more 
likely to affect her policy choice. 
This analysis suggests that a principal might prefer to delegate sub-
stantial discretion even to a non-ally in order to induce greater re-
search investment.55  Likewise, even when the principal has the capac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  53  See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,  105 J. 
POL. ECON. 1, 2–3 (1997); see also Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congres-
sional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63 (1995) (assuming, 
though not deriving, a positive correlation between the scope of an agency’s authority and its ex-
pertise); cf. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 67 (1997) (suggesting, in the context of negotiated rulemaking, that the impulse to limit 
the scope of the negotiation by restricting the number of possible alternatives “conflicts with the 
reality that problem solving requires an effort not to foreclose creative ideas or new conceptions of 
the issues to be negotiated”). 
  54  See Stephenson, supra note 42, at 470–71. 
  55  See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 53, at 2–3.    
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ity to manipulate the agent’s enactment costs in order to perfectly 
align the policy preferences of the principal and the agent, the princi-
pal may not wish to do so.56  In addition to these qualifications to the 
ally principle, the above discussion suggests an inversion of the exper-
tise principle, which assumes that agencies’ superior expertise (partial-
ly) explains the prevalence of broad delegations.  While this assump-
tion may well be true, it may also be the case that the existence of 
broad delegations partially explains why agencies have superior expertise.57 
The main implication of the preceding discussion is that modifying 
the agent’s discretion — either by altering her discretionary window or 
by manipulating her enactment costs — may simultaneously affect 
both the agent’s incentives to gather information ex ante and the 
agent’s incentives regarding use of that information ex post.  This 
double effect may create a difficult trade-off for the principal.  Even 
when the principal has the ability to precommit to a schedule of 
enactment costs that could align the agent’s policy preferences perfect-
ly with the principal’s, the endogeneity of agency research effort may 
lead the principal to prefer a somewhat different schedule of enact-
ment costs.  The principal can offset the agent’s policy bias by raising 
the relative enactment costs of policies that the agent tends to prefer 
more strongly than does the principal.  But the principal can give the 
agent stronger incentives to acquire information by raising the relative 
enactment costs of the policies the uninformed agent would tend to fa-
vor.  These considerations may often go together, but they need not.  
Suppose, for example, that the agent is an environmental regulator de-
ciding whether to implement a new pollution control rule, and the ag-
gregate environmental benefit of the rule takes some value, B, between 
0 and 100, with any number in that range equally likely.  Suppose fur-
ther that the agency views the cost of the regulation as 40, but the leg-
islature (the principal) views the cost as 60.  If the agency’s informa-
tion about B is exogenous, the legislature will prefer to make the 
agency pay an enactment cost of 20 if it adopts the new regulation.  
Doing so will perfectly align the agency’s policy preferences with the 
legislature’s, leading the agency to adopt the regulation if, but only if, 
B is greater than 60.  But if the agency’s information about B is en-
dogenous, the agency’s incentive to invest in such information will be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  56  See Stephenson, supra note 42, at 470–71.  The same change in institutional structure may 
often affect both the agent’s default payoff and her research payoff.  In such cases, assessing the 
net effect on the agent’s research incentives requires sorting out the relative strength of these ef-
fects.  This inquiry in turn requires more specific assumptions, based on more detailed informa-
tion about the specific setting. 
  57  Cf. Aghion & Tirole, supra note 53, at 2–3 (suggesting that granting more authority to an 
agent increases the agent’s initiative and incentive to gain expertise); Gailmard & Patty, supra 
note 37, at 875 (suggesting that “allowing agents to bend policy to their liking” incentivizes “exper-
tise development and a career in public service”).    
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strongest if the enactment cost is 10 (as this enactment cost would 
make the agency ex ante indifferent between regulation and nonregu-
lation).  As the legislature increases the agency’s enactment cost from 0 
to 10, the legislature is both strengthening the agency’s research incen-
tive and aligning the agency’s (induced) policy preferences more closely 
with the legislature’s.  But for enactment costs between 10 and 20, 
these interests trade off: increasing enactment costs from 10 to 20 
moves the agency’s (induced) policy preferences closer to the legisla-
ture’s, but at the cost of weakening the agency’s research incentives. 
Thus, the principal might sometimes prefer to forgo the use of in-
centive schemes that would achieve a closer alignment between the 
principal’s and agent’s policy preferences.  Indeed, a rational principal 
might even prefer to use an enactment cost scheme that moves the pre-
ferences of the agent further from those of the principal, if doing so 
sufficiently reduces the agent’s expected default payoff and/or increas-
es the agent’s expected research payoff.58  The problem for the prin-
cipal is that she must use one tool — the schedule of enactment costs 
— to pursue these two objectives simultaneously.  Thus, the delegation 
scheme that is optimal when the agent’s information is exogenous may 
not be optimal when the agent’s information is endogenous. 
B.  Evidentiary Rules and Burdens 
Often the principal (or the overseers charged with ensuring that the 
agent faithfully implements the scheme enacted by the principal) will 
not be able to observe, comprehend, or verify the evidence in the 
agent’s possession, or even observe accurate proxies for the agent’s re-
search effort.  In those cases, the principal’s ex ante control mechan-
isms will be limited to those discussed in section A.  In other cases, 
however, the principal might be able to precommit to a system in 
which the constraints on the agent’s decision are a function of the 
agent’s information or research effort.  Such constraints might take 
three forms.  The first involves the imposition of evidentiary standards 
— burdens of production and proof — that an agent must meet before 
she is permitted to take certain actions.  Second, the agent might be 
prohibited from considering certain kinds of evidence (or, equivalently, 
disabled from engaging in certain kinds of research).  Third, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  58  See Stephenson, supra note 42.  To see this possibility, suppose in the example in the preced-
ing paragraph that the agency viewed regulatory costs as equal to 60, and the legislature viewed 
these costs as equal to 70.  If the legislature wanted to align the agency’s ex post policy prefer-
ences with its own, it would impose an enactment cost equal to 10.  But if the legislature wanted 
to maximize the agency’s research incentives, it would provide an enactment subsidy equal to 10 
(that is, a negative enactment cost).  If the benefit to the legislature of increasing agency expertise 
is sufficiently large, then even a legislature that is more concerned about regulatory costs than is 
the agency might want to make regulatory interventions relatively more attractive to the agency.    
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agent’s discretion might be conditioned on observable evidence of her 
research effort; this approach can be thought of as granting deference 
to an agent’s perceived “expertise.”  All three of these mechanisms are 
familiar to public law scholars interested in the design of public deci-
sionmaking systems.  And, as the following discussion illustrates, anal-
ysis of all three may be quite different when one replaces the implicit 
assumption of exogenous expertise with the more realistic assumption 
of endogenous expertise. 
1.  Standards of Proof. — A familiar and intuitive way that a prin-
cipal might use ex ante legal or procedural rules to mitigate a potential 
agency problem is for the principal to establish a system (perhaps en-
forced by a third-party adjudicator) in which an agent may take cer-
tain actions if, but only if, the agent produces adequate supporting 
evidence.  For example, a regulatory agency might be permitted to 
adopt a stringent regulation only if it provides to some oversight body 
(for example, a court or review board) detailed scientific and economic 
data establishing that the regulation’s likely benefits outweigh its costs.  
Similarly, a law enforcement agent (for example, a prosecutor or ad-
ministrative enforcement division) may have the power to impose civil 
or criminal penalties on a defendant only if the agent can present to an 
adjudicator (for example, a judicial or administrative tribunal) suffi-
cient evidence of the defendant’s culpability.  These sorts of constraints 
can be thought of as the establishment, by the principal, of the stan-
dard of proof that the agent must satisfy to take different possible ac-
tions.
59  The imposition of a standard of proof implies that the overseer 
can observe (perhaps imperfectly) the content of the evidence in the 
agent’s possession. 
If the agent’s research effort is exogenous, then the principal will 
prefer a standard of proof that permits (indeed, requires) the agent to 
take whatever action the principal prefers in light of the agent’s evi-
dence at the time of decision.  Of course, the strength of the evidence 
and the precise meaning of the linguistic formulations for various 
standards of proof are often open to debate.  But, feasibility concerns 
aside, as a conceptual matter the institutional design problem of select-
ing a standard of proof is trivial when the agent’s research effort is ex-
ogenous and the product of that research effort is observable. 
The problem is more complicated once one considers the effect that 
the standard of proof may have on the agent’s research effort.  Perhaps 
most importantly, imposing a more demanding standard of proof can 
have a similar effect to prohibiting or penalizing the choice that the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  59  This section assumes that the principal commits to a standard of proof ex ante.  Sometimes, 
of course, the “standard of proof” is just the amount of evidence the principal — or some other 
overseer — will demand ex post before deciding that a particular course of action is correct.  This 
possibility is taken up in section II.C, pp. 1453–61.    
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agent is inclined to make ex ante — worsening the agent’s default 
payoff and thereby strengthening the agent’s incentive to do re-
search.60  This phenomenon may sometimes lead a principal to prefer 
a standard of proof that appears too stringent when viewed from an ex 
post perspective.61  In effect, a more demanding evidentiary standard 
increases research effort by mandating a default option that the agent 
views as undesirable ex ante; this penalty default strengthens the 
agent’s incentive to find enough evidence to enable the agency to avoid 
its default payoff.62  A prosecutor who believes a defendant to be 
guilty is more likely to invest heavily in evidence gathering if she 
knows she must prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt than if she 
knows she must prove her case only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.  A regulatory agency that wants to require a new auto safety 
technology will be more inclined to conduct rigorous, in-depth studies 
if the agency is required by statute to provide “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the regulation is justified than would be the case if the 
agency could implement the regulation so long as it provided “substan-
tial evidence” of regulatory benefits. 
The main drawback of this strategy, though, is that if the agent’s 
greater research effort does not guarantee that she will acquire addi-
tional hard information, then committing to a stringent standard of 
proof may lead to suboptimal decisions ex post.  This cost would need 
to be balanced against the informational gains that a more demanding 
standard of proof might spur.  Furthermore, increasing the stringency 
of the standard of proof will not necessarily enhance the agent’s re-
search incentives.  Indeed, under some circumstances, raising the stan-
dard of proof can weaken the agent’s research incentives.  There are 
two ways this weakening may occur.  First, if the principal cannot af-
fect the agent’s default payoff (for example, if the agent both prefers 
the status quo ex ante and can guarantee herself the status quo out-
come by failing to take action), then raising the standard of proof for 
other policy choices may reduce the agent’s research payoff without 
affecting her default payoff.  Second, even if the principal imposes a 
default payoff that the agency views as undesirable, if the standard of 
proof becomes too stringent the agent may simply decide not to act be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  60  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public 
Law, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 351 (2008). 
  61  See Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 44; Hao Li, A Theory of Conservatism, 
109 J. POL. ECON. 617 (2001); Stephenson, supra note 60. 
  62  This situation is roughly analogous to the use of penalty defaults to stimulate costly action 
in other contexts. Cf. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES (2008); Ian Ayres & Ro-
bert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Baker & Krawiec, supra note 3; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, In-
formation and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).    
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cause the agency anticipates that she will probably end up with her 
default payoff no matter how much research she does.63  This outcome 
is one manifestation of the familiar concern about how overly demand-
ing evidentiary requirements can “ossify” public decisionmaking.64  So 
increasing the stringency of the standard of proof may strengthen the 
agent’s research incentives, but only up to the point where the stan-
dard becomes so hard to satisfy that the agent is better off not even 
trying.65 
In addition, the principal may be able to manipulate evidentiary 
standards in order to improve the agent’s research payoff.  Consider a 
case in which the principal and the agent both view a certain policy 
choice as relatively undesirable ex ante, but the amount of evidence it 
would take to convince the agent to adopt that policy is less than the 
amount of evidence that the principal would demand.  If information 
were exogenous, the principal would simply insist that the agent take 
the action only if the agent had enough evidence to convince the prin-
cipal that it was a good idea.  But if research were endogenous, the 
principal’s ex post optimal standard of proof might discourage the 
agent from researching at all.  If the principal lowered the standard of 
proof somewhat, the agent would have more of an incentive to at least 
look into the option in question, and this benefit to the principal from 
the increase in research might outweigh the expected ex post cost. 
2.  Exclusion of Probative Evidence. — Many legal and institution-
al rules attempt to prohibit a decisionmaker from considering certain 
types of apparently useful information.  Most obviously, the law of 
evidence excludes numerous categories of probative evidence.66  Some-
thing similar also occurs in the regulatory context.  For example, some 
statutes prohibit agencies from taking certain seemingly relevant fac-
tors — such as regulatory costs — into account.67  Requirements that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  63  See Stephenson, supra note 60. 
  64  See Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 44; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts 
on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven 
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
  65  See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
(1990) (suggesting that something like this outcome occurred in the auto safety area, where esca-
lating judicial demands for rigorous evidence in support of design standards caused the Depart-
ment of Transportation to abandon that regulatory approach, in favor of the less efficient ex post 
recall of models shown to be unsafe). 
  66  See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 84–86 (1997); see also ALEX 
STEIN,  FOUNDATIONS  OF  EVIDENCE  LAW ( 2005); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial 
Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1992); Dale A. Nance, 
The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988); Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance 
Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447 (1990). 
  67  There is a voluminous literature debating the merits of permitting and prohibiting regulato-
ry agencies to take costs into account when setting regulatory policies.  See, e.g., FRANK ACK-
ERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 35–40 (2004); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL 
A.  LIVERMORE,  RETAKING  RATIONALITY  151–90 ( 2008); CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  THE  COST-
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force a decisionmaker to ignore relevant evidence have widely noted 
disadvantages.68  They may, however, have the advantage of streng-
thening an agent’s incentives to invest effort in acquiring or analyzing 
other sorts of evidence that may be more costly for the agent to ac-
quire, but also more probative.69 
Consider the following example.  Suppose that a legislature dele-
gates to an administrative agency the authority to adopt a pollution 
control regulation.  Both the environmental benefits (B) and the eco-
nomic costs (C) of the regulation are uncertain; ex ante, there is a 25% 
chance that the regulation will produce high environmental benefits 
(B = 100), a 50% chance that it will produce moderate benefits 
(B = 50), and a 25% chance that it will produce no benefits (B = 0).  
On the cost side, there is a 50% chance that the economic costs of the 
regulation are low (C = 40) and a 50% chance that they are high 
(C = 60).  Adopting the regulation gives both the agency and the legis-
lature a payoff of B – C.  The agency has the ability to do additional 
research on both costs and benefits.  At a private cost of 12, the agency 
can conduct an additional scientific analysis that reveals the true envi-
ronmental benefit of the regulation, B.  For a private cost of 4, the 
agency can perform an additional economic analysis that reveals the 
regulation’s true economic burden, C. 
Ideally, the legislature would like the agency to do additional re-
search with respect to both benefits and costs, as this would improve 
the legislature’s expected utility by 15.70  However, although the agen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
BENEFIT STATE (2002); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental 
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); John P. 
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 255–57 (1990); Christo-
pher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 
30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99 (2006); John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law 
and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008); Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Envi-
ronmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303 (2004). 
  68  See, e.g., Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 
49 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 55–61 (2004); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evi-
dence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477 (1999); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of 
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 168–70 (2006). 
  69  See Benjamin Lester et al., Information Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in Tri-
als, J.L.  ECON.  &  ORG. (forthcoming 2011),  available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
early/2009/12/30/jleo.ewp040.full.pdf; see also Friedman, supra note 66; Nance, The Best Evidence 
Principle, supra note 66; Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, supra note 66. 
  70  The legislature’s expected utility if the agency remains uninformed is 0.  If the agency learns 
both B and C before regulating, then there is a 50% chance that the agency will not regulate (a 
25% chance that B is low, plus a 25% chance that B is moderate and C is high), a 12.5% chance 
that both B and C are high (in which case the agency will regulate, giving the legislature a net 
payoff of 40), a 12.5% chance that B is high and C is low (in which case the agency regulates and 
the legislature’s net payoff is 60), and a 25% chance that B is moderate and C is low (in which 
case the agency regulates and the legislature gets a payoff of 10).  Thus, if the agency learns both 
B and C, the legislature’s expected utility is (0.5  ×  0) + (0.125  ×  40) + (0.125  ×  60) + 
(0.25 × 10) = 15.    
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cy would also realize this utility gain, the agency’s total private cost of 
doing research on both benefits and costs is 16.  Left to its own devic-
es, the agency would do additional research on the regulation’s eco-
nomic costs but not its environmental benefits.  Research on costs im-
proves the agency’s expected utility by 5 units but costs the agency 
only 4, for a net gain of 1.71  If the agency conducts research only on 
environmental benefits, the expected utility from the final policy choice 
will be 12.5.72  This expected payoff is larger than the cost of research-
ing environmental benefits (12), but the net expected utility gain to the 
agency, 0.5, is smaller than the net gain from conducting research sole-
ly on the regulation’s economic costs. 
Now suppose that the legislature prohibits the agency from consid-
ering costs when deciding whether to regulate.  Such a rule might seem 
irrational ex post: if the agency has hard evidence that C is high, then 
forcing the agency to regulate even when B is moderate or uncertain 
leads to a net expected utility loss for both the agency and the legisla-
ture.  But viewed from an ex ante perspective, such an evidentiary rule 
can improve the legislature’s welfare.  Left to its own devices, the 
agency would research C rather than B, as this approach improves the 
agency’s expected utility by 1, whereas investigating B rather than C 
improves the agency’s utility by 0.5.  The legislature, however, would 
prefer that the agency research B rather than C if the choice is one or 
the other: if the agency learns B, the legislature realizes an expected 
utility gain of 12.5, whereas if the agency researches only C, the legisla-
ture’s expected utility gain is 5.  Thus, prohibiting the agency from re-
searching C induces the agency to choose its second-best option — re-
search on B — which is better for the legislature. 
Observe that the exclusionary rule illustrated by the preceding ex-
ample is equivalent to the imposition of a more demanding standard of 
proof of the sort discussed in section 1.  By excluding consideration of 
C, the legislature reduces the agency’s default payoff if it does not do 
research on B.  The only twist here is that in order to achieve this re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  71  If the agency learns C but not B, then the agency will regulate if C is low but not if C is 
high.  In the 50% of cases where the agency learns that C is high, the agency does not regulate, 
and the agency’s payoff is 0.  In the 50% of cases where the agency regulates (after learning that C 
is low), the payoff is (0.5 × 10) + (0.25 × 60) – (0.25 × 40) = 10.  This means that, if the agency 
learns C but not B, the expected payoff to the legislature and to the agency (prior to netting out 
research costs) is 0.5 × 10 = 5. 
  72  If the agency learns B but not C, there is a 75% chance that the legislature’s expected payoff 
is 0.  (There is a 25% chance that the agency learns that B is low, in which case the agency will 
not regulate, and a 50% chance that the agency learns that B is moderate, in which case the agen-
cy is indifferent between regulation and nonregulation, as both yield a 0 payoff.)  There is, how-
ever, a 25% chance that the agency will learn that B is high, in which case the agency will regu-
late, giving the legislature an expected payoff of (0.5 × 40) + (0.5 × 60) = 50.  Thus, if the agency 
learns B but not C, the expected payoff to the legislature (and the payoff to the agency prior to 
netting out research costs) is 0.25 × 50 = 12.5.    
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sult, the legislature excludes consideration of other probative evidence, 
in this case, C.  But that is more a difference of technique than sub-
stance.  More generally, this example illustrates that when an agent 
may engage in a variety of research activities that are partial substi-
tutes, and the principal and the agent differ on the optimal allocation 
of agency effort across different research activities (for example, be-
cause the forms of research that are most informative are also the cost-
liest for the agent), the principal may prefer to commit to evidentiary 
rules that discount the significance of the evidence that the agent 
would be most inclined to acquire and magnify the importance of the 
sorts of evidence that the principal views as most useful.73  Doing so 
can lead to ex post inefficiencies but may nonetheless be optimal if the 
informational gains induced by this evidentiary standard outweigh 
those ex post losses.74 
3.  Standards of Deference. — The preceding sections have consi-
dered situations in which the principal can commit to a set of con-
straints on the agent’s discretion that are conditional on the quality of 
the agent’s evidence but are not contingent on the agent’s research ef-
fort.  If, however, the principal can commit to a system in which the 
agent’s freedom of action is conditional on the agent’s research effort 
(or a sufficiently good proxy for research effort), then the principal can 
induce both optimal ex ante research and optimal ex post decisionmak-
ing by threatening the agent with a very bad outcome — mandating a 
decision very far from the agent’s ex ante preferred policy — if the 
agent fails to invest what the principal views as the optimal amount of 
research effort.  However, this approach may not always be feasible.  
Suppose, for instance, that the agent always has the ability to ensure 
that the final outcome is the status quo, for example,  by simply failing 
to take action.  This possibility prevents the principal from lowering 
the agent’s default payoff below her status quo payoff. 
If there is a lower bound on how much the principal can decrease 
the agent’s default payoff, then the principal can strengthen the 
agent’s research incentives further only by improving the agent’s re-
search payoff.  The preceding sections have illustrated a variety of 
ways the principal might do this, such as giving the agent more discre-
tion to choose policies other than her ex ante preferred option and low-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  73  See Lester et al., supra note 69, at 2 (arguing that judges exclude evidence that jurors would 
find easy to understand to focus the jurors on more difficult, but more probative, evidence). 
  74  This conclusion does not mean that the exclusion of particular kinds of evidence is the best 
way to induce an agent to invest in gathering relevant information.  The principal would likely be 
better off if it could impose the optimal ex post evidentiary standard and then offer the agent 
some kind of separate transfer payment, or threaten some separate punishment, based on the 
quantity or quality of the agent’s evidence.  But sometimes these more efficient mechanisms are 
not feasible.  See supra pp. 1433–34.    
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ering the standard of proof associated with such policies.  If the prin-
cipal can make the agent’s discretion contingent on the agent’s re-
search effort, the principal can use these tools more effectively.  For 
example, the principal could guarantee the agent a broader range of 
policy discretion, or a lower standard of evidentiary proof, if the agent 
invested more effort in research.  Doing so is a way for the principal to 
“pay” the agent for doing costly research when more direct subsidies 
are not feasible.  A principal that employs such a strategy establishes, 
in essence, a variable standard of deference in which agents more like-
ly to be “expert” — by virtue of their observable investment in re-
search activities — have greater freedom of action. 
The idea that there might be a positive correlation between an 
agent’s expertise and her policy discretion is a familiar one — this is 
exactly what the well-known uncertainty principle (or expertise prin-
ciple) would predict.75  But the standard argument assumes that the 
principal gives better-informed agents more discretion solely because 
they have more of an informational advantage vis-à-vis the principal.  
The argument sketched above suggests a quite different (though not 
mutually exclusive) reason why a principal might confer more discre-
tion on an agent that invests substantially in acquiring information: to 
create stronger incentives for the agent to invest in costly research.  
Thus, as suggested earlier, policy discretion may be both a response to 
the fact that the agent has better information and a cause of the 
agent’s acquisition of such information.76  This possibility, in turn, 
suggests that when the latter effect is taken into account, the positive 
correlation between expertise and discretion may be substantially 
stronger than the conventional analysis would predict.  “Paying” the 
agent for research by offering more discretion or a lower standard of 
proof is costly to the principal, because doing so may allow the agent 
to make a policy choice ex post that differs from the principal’s optim-
al choice, but that payment may be worth it if it stimulates a sufficient 
increase in the agent’s research effort. 
C.  Ex Post Oversight 
Sections A and B considered the effect of legal and institutional 
“rules of the game” that the principal establishes ex ante.  Another fa-
miliar and important institutional mechanism for addressing the agen-
cy problem involves ex post oversight by the principal (or some other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  75  See supra notes 39–40; see also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: 
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (arguing that recent case law suggests that 
courts are endeavoring “to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside politi-
cal pressures”). 
  76  See section II.A, pp. 1439–46.    
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overseer acting on the principal’s behalf).77  Of course, many of the in-
stitutional mechanisms discussed in the earlier sections also presumed 
some form of oversight, but in those cases the overseer was enforcing a 
set of rules established in advance.  Indeed, a critical presumption of 
the preceding sections was that the principal could credibly precommit 
to those rules and requirements.  Such broad precommitment, howev-
er, may not always be feasible.78  Instead, in many settings the prin-
cipal can only establish forms of review in which the overseer makes 
whatever decision is optimal ex post, rather than enforcing a set of 
rules that would be optimal ex ante. 
This kind of after-the-fact review is an important feature of many 
legal and political institutions.  Most obviously, appellate courts review 
the decisions of lower courts.79  Courts may also review legislative and 
administrative decisions for reasonableness under various constitution-
al and statutory standards.80  Congress oversees, and may overturn by 
statute (or indirectly, through other forms of coercion), the decisions of 
executive branch departments.81  There are also a variety of oversight 
mechanisms within the executive branch, such as review of proposed 
regulations by the Office of Management and Budget.82  This section 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  77  This sort of oversight has often been discussed in the more general context of political au-
dits of bureaucratic performance.  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, 
and Auditing, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 670 (1989); Jeffrey S. Banks & Barry R. Weingast, The Political 
Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 509 (1992); Jona-
than Bendor et al., Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
796 (1987); Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 44; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Auditing 
Politics or Political Auditing? (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 964656, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
964656; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Who Walks the Watchdog? Bureaucratic Oversight and the 
Government Accountability Office (July 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library).  There is a closely related literature on the design of hierarchical court 
systems.  See Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selec-
tion, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SU-
PREME COURT 173 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Rein-
ganum,  Appealing Judgments,  31 RAND  J.  ECON.  502 ( 2000); Steven Shavell, The Appeals 
Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); Matt Spitzer & Eric Tal-
ley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000). 
  78  See supra note 36 (noting the difficulties with the precommitment assumption). 
  79  See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 77; Spitzer & Talley, supra note 77. 
  80  See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 44, at 757–67 (discussing generally controversies surround-
ing judicial review of agency policy choices); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 7–8 (discussing general 
phenomenon of judiciary engaging in interest balancing when conducting constitutional review). 
  81  See, e.g., JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE (1990); Mathew D. McCub-
bins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 
28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 765 (1983). 
  82  See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1986).    
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considers the implications of ex post oversight when the agent’s re-
search effort is endogenous. 
The discussion that follows considers separately three cases, each of 
which makes different assumptions about the information that the 
overseer has at the time it reviews the agent’s decision.  In the first 
case, the agent’s information, once acquired by the agent, is fully 
transparent, such that the overseer can verify the content of that in-
formation.  The second case entails a complete absence of transparen-
cy, in which the overseer can observe neither the agent’s research ef-
fort nor the content of her evidence.  In the third case, the overseer 
cannot observe the agent’s information but can observe the agent’s re-
search effort (or some other proxy for the probability that the agent 
has good information).83  In each case, the analysis focuses on how 
standard positive and normative evaluations of ex post oversight 
might change when the agent’s research effort is endogenous. 
1.  Oversight Under Full Transparency. — In the full transparency 
case, the principal can independently assess and verify the evidence 
that the agent had at the time she made her decision.  In this case, if 
there are no constraints on the principal’s ability to revise the agent’s 
decision, then the agent is relegated to the role of a de facto research 
assistant: although the agent may make a recommendation and pro-
vide supporting evidence, only the evidence (not the recommendation) 
really matters, because the principal makes the actual decision.  If the 
agent’s research effort is exogenous, then the principal will clearly pre-
fer ex post oversight both to a setting in which the agent has unfet-
tered discretion and to a setting in which the principal makes the poli-
cy choice without consulting the agent’s evidence.  Furthermore, the 
agent’s own policy preferences are irrelevant in this case, so the prin-
cipal does not care about influencing those preferences. 
If, however, the agent’s research effort is endogenous, the princi-
pal’s calculations may be quite different.  The effect of ex post over-
sight on the agent’s incentive to do costly research turns on the nature 
of the preference divergence between the principal and the agent.  If 
the expected divergence between the preferred policies of the principal 
and the agent is approximately the same in low-uncertainty and high-
uncertainty environments (or if the principal and the agent are more 
likely to agree on policy in high-uncertainty environments), then ex 
post oversight with full transparency tends to weaken the agent’s re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  83  All three of these cases presume that any additional information the principal acquires must 
come from the agent.  Another possibility is that the principal might also be able to invest costly 
effort in acquiring information, and might make this choice endogenously, in response to the 
agent’s decision.  This possibility is taken up in Part III, pp. 1461–82, which considers informa-
tion gathering in contexts with multiple agents (one of whom might be an overseer acting on be-
half of the principal).    
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search incentives relative to the case in which the agent has uncon-
strained discretion.  The reason is that although ex post oversight re-
duces both the agent’s default payoff and her research payoff, the lat-
ter effect is stronger.84  This result suggests that ex post oversight with 
full transparency may exacerbate the problem of underinvestment in 
information and may therefore be suboptimal for the principal even 
compared to an alternative that gives a somewhat biased agent uncon-
strained policy discretion.85 
There is another possibility, however.  In some plausible scenarios, 
the expected divergence between the preferred policies of the principal 
and the agent will narrow as uncertainty decreases.  In other words, 
the principal and the agent may find themselves in agreement regard-
ing the policy prescriptions that follow from particular forms of hard 
evidence, even though they have dramatically different views of the 
best decision to make when such evidence is unavailable.  For exam-
ple, a bureaucratic agency and a legislative overseer might agree that a 
certain chemical should be banned if it is carcinogenic and left unregu-
lated if it is not, but nonetheless disagree about what to do if the scien-
tific evidence is inconclusive.  The agency, for instance, might prefer to 
err on the side of safety, while the legislature prefers erring on the side 
of nonintervention. 
If the policy preferences of the agent and the principal tend to con-
verge in information-rich environments (or, equivalently, if they tend 
to diverge more sharply in information-poor environments), then the 
adverse impact of oversight on the agent’s default payoff becomes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  84  To illustrate, suppose that an administrative agency must select a degree of regulatory strin-
gency, S, and that the agency’s ideal level of stringency depends on the level of risk from the tar-
geted activity, R.  Suppose further that R is initially uncertain; it is somewhere between 0 and 100, 
with any value in that range equally likely.  Suppose that the agency’s utility from the policy 
choice is 100 – ⏐S – R⏐.  That is, the agency would prefer to set S = R, and its utility decreases 
linearly in the distance between these values.  If there is no oversight, then if the agency remains 
uninformed, it would select S = 50 for a default payoff of 75, whereas if the agency learns R, it 
will select S = R for a research payoff of 100.  Now suppose the agency’s decision is reviewed by 
a legislature that prefers to set S = R – 10.  In this case, then under full transparency the final 
outcome if the agency remains uninformed is S = 40, which gives the agency a default payoff of 
74.  This result is lower than the agency’s default payoff without oversight, but only slightly.  If, 
however, the agency learns R, then the final outcome will be S = R – 10, which gives the agency a 
research payoff of 90 — much lower than its research payoff in the absence of oversight.  The 
intuition that this abstract example illustrates is that the overseer can take advantage of the 
agent’s information to shift the policy outcome even further from the agent’s ideal.  The more in-
formation the agent acquires, the greater the overseer’s ability to take advantage of it, to the 
agent’s detriment. 
  85  See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 53, at 6–7; Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bu-
reaucratic Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536 (2002); Gailmard & Patty, supra note 37, at 875–
86; cf. Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Commit-
tees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
287, 288–89 (1987); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Commit-
tees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531, 533 (1990).    
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larger relative to the adverse impact on the agent’s informed payoff.  
This relationship reduces the adverse impact of oversight on the 
agent’s research incentives and, past a certain point, can actually flip 
the effect, making ex post oversight strengthen rather than weaken an 
agent’s research incentives.  When this is so, then even if establishing 
ex post oversight would be undesirable if agency research were ex-
ogenous (if, for example, setting up the institutions to facilitate mean-
ingful legislative oversight would involve substantial costs), the posi-
tive effect on agency research incentives may make such oversight 
desirable on balance. 
This conclusion has another potentially important implication: if 
the principal has some ability to select (or at least to influence) the 
agent’s preferences, the principal may not necessarily want to select a 
perfect ally.  When the agent’s decision is subject to ex post review, the 
principal can stimulate greater research effort by selecting an agent 
with policy preferences that tend to converge with the principal’s as 
more information becomes available but differ from the principal’s in 
information-poor environments.  In other words, the principal’s ideal 
agent may be one who agrees about ultimate policy objectives in gen-
eral terms but has a quite different approach to decisionmaking under 
uncertainty.  For example, the principal may prefer an agent who places 
different relative weights on the error costs associated with false positives 
and false negatives than does the principal.  For similar reasons, the 
principal might sometimes prefer an agent with similar underlying pol-
icy preferences but quite a different level of risk aversion. 
2.  Oversight Without Transparency. — In many settings involving 
ex post oversight, the substantive content of the agent’s evidence is not 
transparent to the principal (either because the principal literally never 
sees the evidence or because the principal lacks the capacity to under-
stand or verify it).  In such cases, the agent may try to persuade the 
principal to choose a particular policy by announcing the content of 
the evidence it has uncovered.  However, because the principal cannot 
verify the agent’s announcement, that announcement is, in economics 
jargon, “cheap talk.”  If the agent’s preferences diverge from those of 
the principal, the agent has an incentive to misrepresent the content of 
her evidence.  The principal, knowing this, has an incentive to dis-
count the agent’s representations.  This discounting of the agent’s re-
port is stronger when the preference divergence between the principal 
and the agent is larger: when the agent’s preferences and the princi-
pal’s preferences are far apart, the agent has strong incentives to give    
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a misleading report, and the principal consequently pays little atten-
tion to the agent’s recommendation.86 
For example, suppose a scientist with (known) proregulatory policy 
preferences must deliver to a more conservative policymaker a report 
on the health hazards of a certain product.  If the scientist issues an 
honest report, the policymaker will regulate the product much less 
stringently than the scientist believes is optimal.  So the scientist has 
an incentive to issue a report suggesting that the health hazards of the 
product are even worse than they actually are, in the hopes of inducing 
the policymaker to adopt a more stringent policy.  The policymaker, 
however, is aware of this incentive and discounts the report according-
ly.  Thus, in equilibrium, either the scientist will issue an extreme re-
port (which the policymaker will interpret in light of the scientist’s 
known bias)87 or, if the scientist determines that the true health hazard 
is more moderate, the scientist will issue a moderate report that the pol-
icymaker will simply ignore, choosing instead her ex ante preferred 
policy.  This latter result is inefficient, as valuable information (con-
tained in the scientist’s report) is lost because the policymaker does not 
trust the scientist sufficiently.  This inefficiency in communication is 
exacerbated by the fact that, if the principal is also uncertain about the 
agent’s preferences or ability, the agent has an incentive to issue a re-
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  86  The seminal work on cheap talk signaling is Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic 
Information Transmission, 50 E CONOMETRICA  1431 (1982). See also A RTHUR LUPIA & MA-
THEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA (1998); Wouter Dessein, Authority and 
Communication in Organizations,  69 R EV.  ECON.  STUD.  811 ( 2002); Joseph Farrell & Robert 
Gibbons,  Cheap Talk with Two Audiences,  79 A M.  ECON.  REV.  1214 (1989); Joseph Farrell & 
Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1996); Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, A 
Model of Expertise, 116 Q.J. ECON. 747 (2001).  For applications of cheap talk models to political 
and legal institutions, see David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision 
Making, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1992); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons 
from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 589–90, 596–97 (2008); Leslie Johns, A Ser-
vant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats, 61 INT’L 
ORG. 245 (2007); Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme 
Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 468, 503–12 (2007); John 
W. Patty, The Politics of Biased Information,  71 J.  POL.  385 (2009); Otto H. Swank et al., A 
Theory of Policy Advice, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 602, 603–04 (1999); and Sean Gailmard & John 
W. Patty, Congressional Development of the Institutional Presidency (Oct. 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  87  If the scientist learns that the product is actually not hazardous at all, and issues an “ex-
treme” report to that effect, the policymaker will view the report as more credible because it runs 
counter to the scientist’s expected preferences.  If the scientist learns that the product is extremely 
hazardous, and issues a report to that effect, the policymaker may listen because the scientist is 
recommending something that goes well beyond what even someone with her preferences would 
ordinarily endorse, but will still discount the report somewhat, and will issue a regulatory stan-
dard that is not as stringent as what the scientist recommends. 
    Readers familiar with the economic analysis of cheap talk games cited in note 86 will recog-
nize that the explanation in the text is not entirely accurate, and omits important subtleties and 
complexities.  The informal discussion here is intended to give nontechnical readers a basic intui-
tion for why preference divergence leads to informational losses in these settings.    
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port that makes the agent appear in the best light, further devaluing 
the informative content of her recommendation.88  In the above exam-
ple, if the scientist fears dismissal from her post if she is perceived as 
“too left wing,” she may always (or almost always) issue a report to the 
effect that the health hazards of the product under investigation are 
minimal. 
The most important finding of the extant literature on cheap talk 
settings is that both the principal and the agent are better off when 
their preferences are more closely aligned.89  The reason for this result, 
suggested by the example above with the scientist and the policymak-
er, is that an agent can never use a cheap talk report to bias the ex-
pected policy outcome in a favorable direction; the most she can do is 
to make the policy decision more accurate by providing better infor-
mation to the principal.  Preference divergence leads to informational 
losses for both the principal and the agent but does not alter the fact 
that the policy selected will be whichever one seems to be in the prin-
cipal’s best interest.  For this reason, it may sometimes actually be bet-
ter for the principal to eliminate or constrain its ability to review the 
agent’s decision: doing so allows the agent to bias the policy outcome 
but also makes the ultimate choice more informed.90 
These basic results, developed primarily in models that presume 
that the agent’s information is exogenous, may be strengthened when 
the agent’s research decision is endogenous.  After all, the agent knows 
that she cannot do anything to shift the expected policy outcome in a 
favorable direction; the most she can do is to provide the principal 
with a report that will enable the principal to make a more informed 
decision.  However, the greater the divergence between the preferences 
of the principal and the agent, the less likely the agent is to acquire in-
formation that will lead to any change in the principal’s policy deci-
sion.  This tendency is easiest to see in extreme cases: if the principal 
and the agent are perfectly aligned, then any information the agent ac-
quires will be useful, because any report by the agent can induce the 
principal to alter the final policy decision; if the principal and agent 
have such different preferences that the principal will disregard any 
report by the agent, then the agent has no incentive whatsoever to ac-
quire information, since this information will always be ignored. (In 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  88  See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683 (1999); Stephen Morris, Political Correctness, 109 J. POL. ECON. 231 (2001); cf. Pren-
dergast, supra note 24, at 757–59 (explaining the incentive of workers who are subjectively eval-
uated to conform their opinions to those of their supervisors). 
  89  See Crawford & Sobel, supra note 86, at 1442. 
  90  See Bendor & Meirowitz, supra note 38; Boehmke et al., supra note 38; Gailmard & Patty, 
supra note 86; cf. Sven E. Feldmann, Bureaucratic Expertise and Learning from Interest Groups 
(June 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).    
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the above example, if the scientist must do costly research to assess the 
health hazards of a particular product, she is unlikely to do so if she 
expects the policymaker always to choose nonregulation, no matter 
how dire the scientist’s report.)  Preference alignment, then, has two 
desirable effects in this setting: it not only improves information 
transmission (holding the agent’s research effort constant), but also 
may strengthen the agent’s incentive to invest in research. 
3.  Oversight with Observable Research Effort. — In some settings, 
the principal might be able to observe the agent’s research effort (or 
some other proxy for the expected quality of the agency’s information), 
even if the substantive content of the agent’s information remains hid-
den.  For example, even when a legislature, court, or other overseer is 
unable to assess the quality or accuracy of the technical evidence that 
an administrative agency proffers in support of a proposed regulation, 
the overseer might be able to assess how much effort the agency has 
invested in acquiring this evidence.91 
Recall that in settings where the principal could condition a set of 
ex ante rules on the agent’s observable research investment, the prin-
cipal had substantial ability to induce the agent to invest optimally in 
research.  This conclusion no longer holds in ex post oversight settings, 
because the principal often cannot credibly threaten to punish the 
agent (say, by reversing the agent’s decision) if the agent fails to exert 
enough research effort.  Even when the agent’s research effort is ob-
servable, when the substantive content of the agent’s evidence is not 
transparent to the principal, the agent will find herself in a situation 
where her report is cheap talk. 
Even in this cheap talk setting, however, the observability of the 
agent’s research effort may have important effects on the agent’s re-
search incentives.  As noted in the discussion of ex post oversight with 
full transparency,92 there may be cases in which the preferences of the 
principal and agent tend to converge in high-information environ-
ments but diverge in low-information environments, as well as cases in 
which the opposite is true.  When either of those conditions holds, the 
agent’s research investment is an indirect proxy for the degree of pre-
ference alignment between the principal and the agent.  And, as dis-
cussed earlier, in cheap talk settings, the agent’s report is more likely 
to be influential when the preferences of the agent are closer to those 
of the principal. 
These relationships suggest that when the preferences of the prin-
cipal and the agent tend to converge in information-poor environments 
but diverge in information-rich environments, then an agent has even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  91  Cf. Stephenson, supra note 44, at 773–75; Stephenson, supra note 43, at 551. 
  92  See section II.C.1, pp. 1455–57.    
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weaker incentives to invest in research if the principal can observe the 
agent’s research effort.  Perhaps more interestingly, if preferences tend 
to converge as information improves, then the principal will rationally 
treat the agent’s research effort as a proxy for preference alignment.  
Thus, the agent’s report is more influential when the agent has done a 
great deal of research, which in turn strengthens the agent’s research 
incentives.  This result implies a potentially important deviation from the 
ally principle: although the principal prefers an agent who acts as a 
close ally in information-rich environments, the principal may have an 
incentive to select an agent with substantially different preferences in 
information-poor environments.  Selecting such an agent is costly to the 
principal, in that the principal will not be able to extract as much useful 
information from the agent if the agent remains relatively uninformed.  
But this preference divergence intensifies the agent’s incentive to invest 
in research, and it is possible that this informational gain outweighs 
the losses associated with less efficient information transmission. 
III.  RESEARCH INCENTIVES WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS 
Analyzing the research incentives of a single agent is useful in 
building intuition and establishing some basic concepts.  However, 
most public decision settings entail at least the potential for multiple 
agents to contribute to information gathering.  Most of the relevant 
government “agents” — including legislatures, bureaucratic agencies, 
judiciaries, and executives — are in fact composed of many individu-
als,93 and many public decisions involve contributions from more than 
one of these entities.  Indeed, much recent work in institutional design 
theory has moved beyond the simple question of which among several 
possible agents should have principal responsibility for a particular 
policy decision to the more complex question of how to arrange deci-
sionmaking systems that entail input from many different agents.94  
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  93  See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dan-
gerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–18 (2006); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is 
a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240–41 
(1992); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy 
of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 549, 554–55 (2005). 
  94  See, e.g., Justin Fox & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Review as a Response to Political 
Posturing, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Justin Fox & Richard Van Weelden, Par-
tisanship and the Effectiveness of Oversight, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 674 (2010); Saul Levmore, Bicam-
eralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 145–46, 162 
(1992); Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 3, at 631–37; Torsten Persson et al., Separation of Pow-
ers and Political Accountability, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1163 (1997); James R. Rogers, Legislative Incen-
tives and Two-Tiered Judicial Review: A Game Theoretic Reading of Carolene Products Footnote 
Four, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1096 (1999); Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 23. 
    In addition, an important strain of the political economy literature considers settings involv-
ing multiple principals, which compete to influence the behavior of one or more common agents.  
See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 
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This literature, however, like the more traditional institutional compe-
tence literature, tends to neglect the related question of how the design 
of multi-agent systems affects the efficient production (or discovery) of 
information. 
Many of the considerations discussed in Part II may also be present 
in settings involving multiple agents.  The focus of Part III, however, 
is on additional considerations peculiar to multi-agent settings.  The 
following three sections focus on broad categories of decisionmaking 
systems that involve contributions from several different agents.  The 
first, and most straightforward, considers settings in which multiple 
agents are independently responsible for providing informational in-
puts into some decision, whether in the form of votes or nonbinding 
advice.  The second section turns to settings in which two or more 
agents investigate a similar policy question sequentially rather than 
simultaneously.  The third section turns to systems that seek to induce 
competition among government agents with respect to the provision of 
useful information. 
A.  Simultaneous Information Aggregation 
A recent trend in both the scholarly and popular literatures on pub-
lic decisionmaking emphasizes the advantages of aggregating dispersed 
information from a large number of parties, as an alternative (or sup-
plement) to reliance on a smaller number of expert decisionmakers.95  
The basic insight underlying what has been popularly dubbed the 
“wisdom of crowds”96 dates back at least to the Marquis de Condor-
cet’s famous Jury Theorem, which demonstrates that a group of lay 
jurors who decide by majority rule can arrive at the correct answer 
more often than can a single expert.97  “Many minds,” according to one 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
923 (1986); David Martimort & Lars Stole, The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common 
Agency Games,  70 E CONOMETRICA  1659 ( 2002); Takuro Yamashita, Mechanism Games with 
Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents, 78 ECONOMETRICA 791 (2010).  For reasons of 
space and tractability, this Article does not consider endogenous information acquisition in multi-
principal settings.  In the real world, however, many important government decision problems 
may involve multiple principals, and a natural extension of this line of research would consider 
endogenous information acquisition in such settings. 
  95  See, e.g., SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007); SUNSTEIN, MANY MINDS, supra 
note 4; JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM  OF CROWDS (2004); JEREMY WALDRON, THE 
DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 124–66 (1999). 
  96  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 95, at xiv. 
  97  See MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS 
TO THE  THEORY  OF  DECISION-MAKING ( 1785),  reprinted in C ONDORCET:  SELECTED 
WRITINGS 33 (Keith M. Baker ed., 1976).  For a succinct modern formalization (and extension) of 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, see Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, 
and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617 (1992).  An excellent informal summary of the theo-
rem and its most important extensions appears in Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments, supra note 
4, at 4–9.    
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influential modern formulation of Condorcet’s insight, are often better 
than few.98  The Condorcet Jury Theorem has inspired a range of rec-
ommendations for legal and institutional reform (as well as further jus-
tifications for existing institutions).99  The common thread linking 
these analyses is the proposition that, at least for the types of decisions 
where the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem are likely to be 
satisfied, decisionmaking systems should strive to aggregate the dis-
persed information held by large numbers of parties. 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem focuses on the aggregation of infor-
mation through voting, and many of the modern applications of the 
theorem likewise focus on voting systems or settings involving aggre-
gation of nonbinding advice.  Institutional designers sometimes also 
seek contributions from multiple agents by designing systems with 
built-in institutional overlap or redundancy, both horizontal and ver-
tical.  (“Horizontal” redundancy refers to settings in which two or more 
separate agents are responsible for a similar task, such as producing 
information about a public policy problem.  “Vertical” redundancy re-
fers to systems of appeal and review, in which a hierarchically superior 
agent may scrutinize, and possibly revise, a decision made by a hierar-
chically inferior agent.)  Redundant systems are thought to act as a 
form of insurance: if one agent fails in her task, another agent’s contri-
butions may compensate.  Furthermore, if agents’ contributions are 
partial rather than perfect substitutes (that is, if the agents’ functions 
overlap but are not fully redundant), then the contributions from mul-
tiple agents may add value to the final outcome even if none of them 
shirk.100 
This sort of institutional redundancy or overlap may be valuable in 
the production of policy-relevant information.  Instead of charging one 
scientific panel with ascertaining the causes and likely consequences of 
global climate change, the government can assign this responsibility to 
multiple panels.  Instead of relying on a single court to scrutinize the 
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  98  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, MANY MINDS, supra note 4. 
  99  See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 4, at 197–216; SUNSTEIN, MANY MINDS, supra 
note 4 (explaining how many-minds arguments do and should play a role in constitutional inter-
pretation); VERMEULE,  supra note 4 (arguing that the Condorcet Jury Theorem and similar 
many-minds arguments suggest reasons to favor lawmaking by nonjudicial institutions); Michael 
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 C OLUM. L. REV.  1600,  1632–36 (2000); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 96–100, 115–17 (1986); Lev-
more, supra note 4, at 734–39. 
  100  See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS 209–45 (1985); JAMES Q. WIL-
SON, BUREAUCRACY 274 (1989); Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: In-
terest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Katyal, supra note 93, at 
2314–27; Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 
29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969); O’Connell, supra note 4; Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and 
Spending Programs,  100 N W.  U.  L.  REV.  1197,  1222–39 ( 2006); Michael M. Ting, A Strategic 
Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003).    
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facts of a contested case, the judicial system might provide for a 
second look at the facts by an appellate panel.  The President may 
consult the head of a cabinet department for policy advice but also 
create a “stovepipe” that allows the President to acquire information 
from other agents elsewhere in the bureaucracy, or may seek a second 
opinion from another government department with partly overlapping 
responsibilities.101 
While many analysts have stressed the advantages of drawing on 
information from a larger number of agents, the enthusiasm for many-
minds arguments has not gone unchallenged.  Many scholars have 
pointed out the limits of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, particularly in 
cases where decisionmakers have strongly correlated biases,102 where 
they vote strategically,103 or where there is no underlying consensus on 
the “correct” answer.104  Likewise, institutional redundancy has well-
known costs, including wasteful duplication of effort and socially un-
productive turf battles.105  There is now a vigorous debate in the pub-
lic law literature about the implications, if any, of many-minds argu-
ments for the design of public institutions.  Much (though certainly not 
all) of this debate focuses on how best to make use of information that 
various agents already possess, without considering the implications of 
different arrangements for the incentive to gather information.  Yet 
this latter consideration may have important implications for questions 
regarding the optimal number of agents involved in providing infor-
mational inputs into a particular public decision, questions about the 
optimal collective decision rule for translating these separate inputs in-
to a final policy choice, and questions regarding the optimal composi-
tion of multimember bodies.  Let us consider each in turn. 
1.  The Number of Agents. — By far the most important implication 
that endogenous expertise may have for the many-minds debate — 
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  101  See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Stovepiping (Aug. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Vermeule, Second Opinions, supra note 4. 
  102  See Ladha, supra note 97, at 625–30; Christian List & Philip Pettit, An Epistemic Free-
Riding Problem?, in KARL POPPER: CRITICAL APPRAISALS 128 (Philip Catton & Graham Mac-
donald eds., 2004). 
  103  See David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34 (1996). 
  104  See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 327, 337–39 (2002); N.W. Barber, Two Meditations on the Thoughts of Many Minds, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 807, 817–18 (2010) (book review). 
  105  See generally WILSON, supra note 100; Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Inno-
vation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008); Neal Devins & Michael 
Herz,  The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation,  5 U.  PA.  J. 
CONST. L. 558 (2003); William V. Roth, Jr., The “Malmanagement” Problem: Finding the Roots of 
Government Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961 (1983); Nathan Alexander 
Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 279 (2010).  The role of competition among agents is explored in greater detail in section 
III.C, pp. 1479–82.    
2011]  INFORMATION ACQUISITION  1465 
and the one that has received the most attention in the extant litera-
ture — is that increasing the number of agents involved in researching 
a public decision problem tends to reduce each individual agent’s in-
centive to invest heavily in doing that research.  Information acquisi-
tion may often suffer from a collective action problem, in which each 
agent is tempted to free ride, shirking her own obligations to invest in 
costly research in the hopes that others will do enough of the work to 
produce a sufficiently high-quality final decision.106  A s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
true with collective action problems, the more agents that are involved 
in the production of the public good (in this case, information), the 
stronger is the incentive to free ride.107 
This collective action problem may provide a reason to be skeptical 
of wisdom-of-crowds arguments.  The traditional Condorcet Jury 
Theorem framework, as well as most of its more modern formulations 
and permutations, assumes that each agent gets some “signal” of the 
correct answer to the question at issue and that the probability that 
the agent gets the right signal is exogenous (that is, unaffected by the 
agent’s own strategic choices).  While these assumptions may be rea-
sonable in some settings, as when the relevant population already pos-
sesses information on the question at hand,108 it is often more plausible 
that the quality of each agent’s signal depends on the amount of effort 
she devotes to investigating the issue.  As the number of agents in-
volved in making a decision increases, the collective action problem 
outlined above intensifies, and the quality of each individual agent’s 
information is likely to worsen.  (This effect — known as the “rational 
ignorance” problem — has long been recognized in other contexts, 
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  106  The seminal modern work on the collective action problem is MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  For applications of the collective action problem spe-
cifically to the production of information for public policymaking, see Brian Galle & Joseph 
Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 1333, 1346–71 (2009); Garrett, supra note 5, at 1509–13; Li, supra note 61; Nicola Persico, 
Committee Design with Endogenous Information, 71 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 169–83 (2004); and 
Ting, supra note 100, at 277–88.  Cf. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Asher Wolinski, Second Opinions 
and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 417 
(2003). 
  107  There may, however, be countervailing factors when agents have incentives to acquire in-
formation beyond their interest in making the correct collective decision.  For example, if agents 
receive a private benefit from appearing well informed (as might occur when the appearance of 
expertise may improve the agent’s reputation), then expanding the size of the group might some-
times strengthen each agent’s incentive to acquire information, because a larger group means both 
more people within the group to impress and more rivals in the competition to impress outside 
observers.  While it is worth acknowledging this possibility, it nonetheless seems plausible that in 
a broad range of decision contexts, the free rider problem will predominate, such that the incen-
tive to invest in information decreases as the size of the decisionmaking body increases. 
  108  See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 88–89; César Martinelli, Would Rational Voters Acquire 
Costly Information?, 129 J. ECON. THEORY 225, 226–27 (2006).    
1466  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 124:1422 
such as voting by citizens and shareholders, and in private markets.109)  
So increasing the number of agents involved in making a decision 
presents a trade-off: doing so increases the quantity of signals received 
(which tends to increase the probability of making the correct decision) 
but also decreases the average quality of those signals (which tends to 
decrease the probability of making the correct decision).110  Often the 
former effect will outweigh the latter effect, but under plausible cir-
cumstances — particularly those in which each agent must pay some 
fixed cost to get any sort of informative signal about a policy problem 
— increasing the number of agents involved may actually decrease the 
overall quality of information.111 
The collective action problem also has implications for the use of 
horizontal institutional redundancy in the production of information.  
As noted above, the main advantage of this sort of redundancy is that 
it increases the odds that even if one agent fails to complete her as-
signed research task adequately, another agent will pick up the slack.  
The problem is that when agents must invest costly effort in order to 
produce useful research, and two or more agents are responsible for 
producing the same sort of information (or when the types of informa-
tion each one produces are sufficiently similar to function as partial 
substitutes), the collective action problem tends to induce suboptimal 
research effort.112  Institutional redundancy thus gives rise to a trade-
off that parallels the trade-off present when information aggregation 
takes the form of voting: greater systemic redundancy increases the 
probability of effective information production when the research ef-
fort of the individual agents is taken as given, but for precisely that 
reason redundancy tends to reduce the research effort of each individ-
ual agent and may worsen the aggregate production of information. 
The above analysis suggests, as a general rule of thumb, that legal 
or institutional systems that draw on the information of a larger num-
ber of agents, whatever their other advantages, run the risk of weaken-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  109  See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
83 (1991); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
  110  See Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush, Optimum Committee Size: Quality-Versus-Quantity 
Dilemma, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 429, 429–34 (2003); List & Pettit, supra note 102, at 128; 
Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2003); 
Persico, supra note 106, at 167–82; Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments, supra note 4, at 28–29.  
This insight dates back at least to Jeremy Bentham.  See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 413 (2007) (quoting Bentham as asserting that “[t]he greater the number of voters the 
less the weight and the value of each vote, the less its price in the eyes of the voter, and the less of 
an incentive he has in assuring that it conforms to the true end and even in casting it at all” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
  111  See Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance, 
10 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 281, 292 (2008); Martinelli, supra note 108, at 226.  
  112  See Ting, supra note 100, at 275–77.    
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ing agents’ research incentives.  To put the problem in the terminology 
developed earlier in this Article, when multiple agents are responsible 
for providing decision-relevant information (whether via voting, advice 
giving, or some other mechanism), the difference between each agent’s 
research payoff and default payoff tends to shrink.  Whether the net 
effect on aggregate information acquisition is positive or negative will 
depend on context, but there are at least some situations in which the 
exacerbation of the rational ignorance problem outweighs the informa-
tional benefits of making use of many minds. 
This bleak assessment may not apply, however, when the types of 
information provided by different agents to a single decisionmaker are 
complements rather than substitutes.  (Pieces of information are substi-
tutes if the possession of one piece of information decreases the mar-
ginal value of acquiring the second piece.  Pieces of information are 
complements when the possession of one piece of information increases 
the marginal value of acquiring the second piece.)  Indeed, when effec-
tive research entails generating complementary forms of information 
(that is, where the informational whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts), dividing complementary research tasks among different agents 
may enhance rather than undermine each agent’s research incen-
tives.113  Consider a setting in which a government decision turns on 
two complementary pieces of information: the expected value (for both 
the principal and all agents) of acquiring, and basing the decision on, 
both pieces of information is 10 units of utility, while the expected val-
ue of acquiring one piece of information, but not both, is 3 units.114  
Suppose further that the private cost to an agent of acquiring one of 
these pieces of information is 6 units, so that the total private cost of 
acquiring both pieces is 12 units.  If both research tasks are assigned to 
one agent, that agent will not research either type of evidence.  How-
ever, assigning the two research tasks to two separate agents can in-
duce research effort: it is in each agent’s interest to invest in research if 
she expects the other to do so; thus, there is an equilibrium in which 
the government can induce optimal research investment by dividing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  113  See Persico, supra note 106, at 167; Ting, supra note 100, at 284–87. 
  114  For an example of pieces of information that might be complementary, consider a hypothet-
ical municipal planning board deciding whether to implement a given land use regulation or local 
public works project.  The board might be uncertain about whether the regulation will increase or 
decrease housing density and whether social welfare overall is positively or negatively correlated 
with housing density.  If the board has good information on both issues, it is well equipped to 
make the right decision.  But having good information on only one of the two questions is not 
very useful: even if the board knows that the regulation will increase (or decrease) housing densi-
ty, the board cannot make a good urban planning decision if it remains unsure whether it should 
be trying to increase or decrease density; likewise, even if the board knows that it should be trying 
to increase (or decrease) density, this information is of little use if the board remains ignorant re-
garding whether the regulation at issue will increase or decrease density.    
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the investigation of complementary questions among different agents, 
even though it is impossible to achieve this result if these tasks are all 
a single agent’s responsibility.115 
Although the above example is abstract, it illustrates a significant, 
if subtle, substantive point: the impact of dividing research tasks 
among multiple agents may depend critically on whether the types of 
information they are charged with producing are substitutes or com-
plements.116  When different types of information are substitutes — 
when the marginal value of one type of information declines as more 
information of other types becomes available — then dividing the re-
sponsibility for acquiring information, whatever its other advantages, 
will tend to dampen research incentives.  In contrast, dividing respon-
sibility for researching complementary types of information may 
strengthen research incentives.  It seems reasonable to conjecture that 
in most cases the former scenario is more likely, which would imply 
that it makes sense to begin with the presumption, prevalent in the ex-
tant literature, that increasing the number of agents tends to under-
mine individual agents’ research incentives.  Nonetheless, this pre-
sumption must be qualified by the recognition that division of tasks 
may in fact enhance research incentives in those cases where different 
types of information are complementary. 
2.  The Collective Decision Rule. — For reasons similar to those 
discussed in the preceding section, the endogeneity of agents’ informa-
tion may complicate the analysis of the voting rule that collective bod-
ies ought to employ.  For instance, an important strain of scholarship 
has identified significant advantages to supermajority rules under cer-
tain circumstances, in particular, circumstances in which the institu-
tional designer would like to build in a bias in favor of the status quo 
(or some other default outcome).117  A supermajority rule has the at-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  115  When tasks are divided, there is also an equilibrium in which neither agent invests in re-
search effort; if one agent does not invest in research, the optimal response of the other agent is 
not to do research either.  In order to determine which equilibrium the agents would select, one 
would need to appeal to other criteria — perhaps including the fact that the equilibrium in which 
both invest in research yields a higher payoff to both of them than does the equilibrium in which 
neither invests in research.  Likewise, if the agents make their research decisions sequentially ra-
ther than simultaneously, then the only equilibrium is the one in which both agents invest in re-
search.  The second agent to move will mimic the first agent’s choice, which means that the first 
agent will choose to invest in research, knowing that the second will rationally follow suit. 
  116  See Ting, supra note 100, at 287–88. 
  117  See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 Y ALE L.J. 
676, 679–88, 708–12 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, The Condorcet Case for Su-
permajority Rules, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67 (2008); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappa-
port, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007); 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six–Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Su-
preme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 954–62 (2003); see also Ruth C. Ben-Yashar & Shmuel I. Nit-
zan, The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: 
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tractive feature of allowing a change from the default policy only if a 
sufficiently large number of agents have independently concluded the 
change is a good idea, which would imply a particularly high degree of 
confidence that the change is justified. 
This argument for supermajority rules typically presumes that each 
voter votes independently and sincerely — assumptions that may not 
always hold true.118  Even if these assumptions do hold, however, the 
benefits of supermajoritarianism can be undermined when the quality 
of each voter’s information is endogenous: holding group size constant, 
as the size of the supermajority required to effect a policy change be-
comes larger, the probability that any individual will cast the decisive 
vote will change and may often decrease.  This possibility, in turn, im-
plies that if each agent’s information (or a substantial portion of it) 
remains private, the difference between the research payoff and de-
fault payoff shrinks for each agent as the supermajoritarian threshold 
for policy change approaches unanimity.119  Thus, changing the collec-
tive decision rule — say, by switching from a simple majority rule to a 
supermajority rule — may reduce the accuracy of the decision by re-
ducing aggregate investment in information. 
It is easiest to illustrate this effect with an extreme case.  Suppose 
that a large committee of homogeneous agents may vote (simulta-
neously and by secret ballot) to adopt a new policy.  In keeping with 
the traditional arguments in favor of supermajority rules, let us sup-
pose (despite the problematic nature of this supposition) that each 
agent casts her vote independently and sincerely.  Let us assume fur-
ther (and in contrast with the more conventional analyses of superma-
joritarian voting rules) that information is endogenous: each agent is 
initially uninformed but can improve her probability of casting a cor-
rect vote by investing costly effort in research.  Assume that the results 
of each individual agent’s research remain her private information.   
Thus, each agent’s research is valuable to her only if she ends up cast-
ing the pivotal vote.  The probability of casting the deciding vote un-
der a simple majority rule is not very high, but at least if the group is 
not too large, it is not trivial.  This probability gives each agent an in-
centive to do at least some research.  Under a unanimity rule, however, 
the probability that any given agent will cast the deciding vote is likely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The General Result, 38 INT’L ECON. REV. 175, 181–83 (1997) (providing a general model that 
establishes conditions under which a supermajority rule is optimal). 
  118  See, e.g., Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Infe-
riority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strategic Voting, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 23, 31–32 
(1998). 
  119  See Persico, supra note 106, at 165–68; see also David Austen-Smith & Timothy Feddersen, 
Deliberation and Voting Rules, in SOCIAL CHOICE  AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS 269 (David 
Austen-Smith & John Duggan eds., 2005).    
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to be much lower.  Unless the quality of each agent’s signal is very 
high (such that the signals exhibit an extremely strong positive correla-
tion), the likelihood (from the standpoint of any given agent) that all 
other agents will vote for the policy change is quite low, which makes 
her vote likely irrelevant to the outcome. 
For example, consider a committee of three voters, A,  B, and C.  
Suppose that the ex ante probability that a proposed new policy is bet-
ter than the status quo is 50%.  To keep the example simple, let us fo-
cus on the research investment decision of agent A.  We will assume 
that B’s and C’s research investments are exogenous; both B and C 
have a 75% chance of correctly assessing whether the new policy is su-
perior to the status quo; they make these assessments independently; 
and they vote in accordance with their individual assessments.  Thus, 
the probability that both B and C vote for the change (making A’s 
vote pivotal under a unanimity rule but meaningless under a simple 
majority rule) is 31.25%.  The probability that B and C split their 
votes (making A’s vote pivotal under a simple majority rule but mean-
ingless under a unanimity rule) is 37.5%.120  Thus, in this example A 
would invest more in research under a simple majority rule than she 
would under a unanimity rule.121 
Of course, B and C are likely also to make endogenous decisions 
regarding research effort.  To fully solve for the equilibrium of even 
this simple model, one would need to derive a research investment lev-
el for all three agents such that none would have an incentive to de-
viate.  Moreover, the preceding analysis assumed that agents vote sin-
cerely and independently.  While these assumptions are useful 
simplifications and are common in the extant legal literature on su-
permajority rules, they are likely wrong in many cases.  Relaxing the 
assumptions of sincere and independent voting may substantially alter 
predictions about equilibrium behavior.122  A full analysis of the im-
pact of supermajority rules would also need to take these considera-
tions into account. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  120  Call a “Y” vote a vote for the new policy and an “N” vote a vote for the status quo, and let p 
be the probability that agents B and C correctly assess whether it is a good idea to adopt the new 
policy.  Ex ante, agent A recognizes that there are four possible ways that the other two agents 
might vote (YY, YN, NY, and NN), and the respective probabilities of each of these scenarios, 
given the assumptions of the example, are 0.5 × (p
2 + (1 – p)
2),  p × (1 – p),  p × (1 – p), and 
0.5 × (p
2 + (1 – p)
2).  Under simple majority rule, agent A’s vote is pivotal in the second and third 
scenarios, but not in the first or fourth.  The values in the text are generated by setting p = 0.75. 
  121  This result, however, would not hold for very high levels of accuracy.  To illustrate, consider 
an extreme case in which B and C get a signal that is 100% accurate (p = 1).  In that case, A can 
never cast a deciding vote under a simple majority rule (because the other two will always vote 
either YY or NN), but may well cast a deciding vote under a unanimity rule (if B and C vote 
YY). 
  122  See, e.g., Austen-Smith & Banks, supra note 103; Feddersen & Pesendorfer, supra note 118.    
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We need not pursue that full analysis here, however, as the preced-
ing discussion merely illustrates the more general point that a change 
in the collective decision rule, by altering each agent’s probability of 
being pivotal, may alter each agent’s research incentive.  The most in-
teresting potential consequence of this insight for the existing legal lit-
erature on supermajority rules is that, whatever their other virtues and 
vices, supermajority rules may induce a substantial reduction in both 
individual and aggregate information production.123 
A crucial feature of the preceding analysis, however, is the assump-
tion that the information each agent acquires remains her private in-
formation.  Sometimes, though, costly information gathering improves 
the accuracy of every agent in the collective decisionmaking body.  In 
such situations, a supermajority rule may actually strengthen research 
incentives, because the pivotal voter in the group will be more skepti-
cal of the proposed policy than the median voter will be.  Thus, those 
agents who favor a particular change will not be able to stop their re-
search efforts and proceed to a vote once they have enough informa-
tion to convince a majority of the group; rather, they will have to con-
tinue to invest in information gathering until they have enough 
information to convince the requisite supermajority.124  In other words, 
“veto power or unanimity represents a constraint that induces deliber-
ation: when parties can block outcomes, actors have an incentive to 
find reasons which are convincing to all, not just to the majority.”125  
(Note that in this case, the supermajority requirement functions as a 
more stringent standard of proof and induces information acquisition 
in a similar fashion.126)  Thus, supermajority rules not only may affect 
agents’ incentives to invest in information, but also may have differen-
tial effects on their incentives to acquire different kinds of information.  
More demanding supermajority requirements may reduce agents’ in-
centives to invest in the production of private information, as superma-
jority rules tend to decrease each agent’s probability of casting the pi-
votal vote, but more demanding supermajority requirements may 
simultaneously increase agents’ incentives to invest in public or shared 
information, because agents sympathetic to a proposed change will 
need to work harder to win over the (more skeptical) pivotal voter. 
3.  Preference Heterogeneity. — The preceding discussion implicitly 
assumed that the different agents involved had similar preferences.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  123  See Persico, supra note 106, at 165–66. 
  124  See Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv, Sequential Deliberation 21 (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  125  Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Democratic or Technocratic Governance? 15 (NYU Sch. of Law Jean 
Monnet Working Papers, Paper No. 6/01,  2001),  available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/ 
jeanmonnet/papers/01/011201.html. 
  126  See supra pp. 1447–49.    
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Yet one of the issues that has attracted the most attention from legal 
scholars interested in collective decisionmaking is the role of diversity, 
particularly preference heterogeneity.  Indeed, much of the institutional 
design literature hypothesizes that increasing diversity on multimemb-
er decisionmaking bodies tends to lead both to more moderation and 
to more accuracy.127  The literature has suggested a variety of reasons 
for this pattern, including the hypotheses that diverse groups are less 
likely to exhibit correlated biases or groupthink,128 that diverse groups 
tend to seek consensus and avoid dissent,129 and that minority mem-
bers can act as whistleblowers, threatening to disclose malfeasance or 
sloppiness to the principal (or some other monitor).130 
The fact that information acquisition is often endogenous may 
supply another perspective on the differences between the behaviors of 
ideologically diverse and ideologically homogeneous groups, as well as 
another tentative reason to favor diversity — particularly in the form 
of including the representation of minority views — in collective deci-
sionmaking.  Certain forms of ideological diversity may create stronger 
incentives for agents to acquire information, and this effect may imply 
that ideologically diverse bodies are sometimes superior not only to 
bodies whose members exhibit strongly correlated biases, but also to 
homogeneous bodies whose members are entirely unbiased.131  The 
reason is that a minority faction’s default payoff tends to be systemati-
cally worse than the majority faction’s, and this payoff structure gives 
the minority faction a stronger incentive to invest in information, in 
the hopes of changing the majority’s mind.132 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  127  See P AGE, supra note 95, at 153–58; CASS R. SUNSTEIN  ET  AL., ARE JUDGES POLITI-
CAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 135–40 (2006); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 92–93, 108–09 (2000). 
  128  See PAGE, supra note 95, at 48–50; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 
140–44 (2003); Ladha, supra note 97, at 627. 
  129  See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1639, 1651 (2003); Joshua B. Fischman, Understanding Voting Behavior in Circuit Court 
Panels 38–42 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 
No.  2010-27,  2010),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636002; 
Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making Under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural Analysis of 
Three-Judge Panels 15 (Jan. 4,  2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912299; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 32–34 
(2008) (describing how appellate judges’ reluctance to dissent can produce consensus even on 
ideologically diverse panels). 
  130  See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Y ALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Jonathan 
P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 421 (2007). 
  131  See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic Information Acquisi-
tion and Diversity in Judicial Panels (Aug. 23,  2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/documents/Talley2010.pdf. 
  132  See id. at 19.    
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To illustrate, consider a hypothetical three-judge appellate panel.  
Assume that each of the three judges may be one of two types, which 
for simplicity we will call Democrat and Republican.  The judges have 
to make some collective decision, by majority rule, whether to over-
turn a lower court decision.  Assume that, on a cursory analysis of the 
decision below (focusing on, for example, information about the identi-
ties of the parties, the reputation of the lower court judge, and the na-
ture of the issue), a Democratic judge would think there is a 75% 
chance that the lower court decision was correct, while a Republican 
judge would put the probability of a correct decision below at 25%.  
Each judge receives a payoff of 100 units of utility if the panel decides 
the appeal correctly (upholding a correct lower court decision or re-
versing an incorrect decision) and receives a payoff of 0 otherwise.   
Each judge can also invest additional time and effort into a more so-
phisticated analysis of the case that will identify the legally correct an-
swer (and do so in a way that is verifiable by her colleagues).  Such ef-
fort would cost the judge 40 units of utility. 
In a homogeneous panel, the judges will tend to agree on what ap-
pears to be the best decision.  The incentive of any one of them to ex-
pend additional effort to ascertain the correct answer is relatively low, 
for two reasons.  First, it is unlikely that additional information will 
lead to a different decision.  (Put another way, each judge’s default 
payoff is high relative to her research payoff.)  Second, the collective 
action problem means that each of the three judges has an incentive to 
free ride on the others’ efforts.  So, for example, on a panel consisting 
of three Democrats, each judge’s expected payoff from affirming the 
decision below is 75.  If any one judge invests extra effort to ascertain 
the right answer, the judges who free ride get a payoff of 100, while 
the judge who does the work gets a payoff of 100 – 40 = 60.  Thus, no 
judge is willing to do the extra work, and the work will not get done.133 
Now consider a panel with two Democratic judges and one Repub-
lican judge (or vice versa).  The minority judge has considerably 
stronger incentives to invest in additional research to attempt to per-
suade her colleagues to change their minds because the minority 
judge’s default payoff (25) is low relative to her research payoff (100).  
This phenomenon is similar to the setting discussed in section II.C.1, 
in which the principal reviewed an agent’s decision and the principal 
and agent had preferences that diverged substantially in low-
information environments but converged in high-information envi-
ronments.  In that setting, the agent’s incentive to invest in research 
was higher than in a case where the agent was a closer ally of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  133  The assumption here, of course, is that the judges cannot solve the collective action problem 
by cooperating, for example, by sharing the workload.    
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principal, with preferences that were similar in both low- and high-
information environments.  The reason was that an agent that disa-
greed with the principal about what to do in a low-information envi-
ronment had a greater interest in finding more information.  In the 
case of multi-judge panels (or multi-agent panels more generally), the 
majority faction is analogous to the principal in the earlier example, 
while the minority faction is analogous to the agent. 
The analogy to the earlier case also highlights that this positive ef-
fect of ideological diversity may not obtain when the preference diver-
gence between the majority and minority factions on the panel remains 
constant (or increases) as the amount of information increases.  In 
these settings, ideological diversity might actually dampen research in-
centives.  After all, if the minority judge knows that any information 
she provides might be used by the majority faction to craft a ruling 
that is even more distant from her ideal ruling, then she has consider-
ably weaker incentives to do research.  A panel composed of homoge-
neous judges, while still subject to a collective action problem, would 
not suffer from this difficulty, and the individual judges might invest 
more in research than would a minority judge who would view the 
case as a lost cause from the beginning and refuse to add anything to 
the discussion.134 
B.  Sequential Information Aggregation 
When crafting a system in which multiple agents may supply or 
use information in making a policy decision, institutional designers 
must often take into account the timing of the agents’ inputs.  While 
this inquiry may entail a variety of considerations, a common general 
issue is whether agents’ contributions are simultaneous or sequential.  
This timing decision, as relevant here, determines whether some agents 
can observe other agents’ decisions and/or information prior to making 
their own decisions.135  (In that sense, a system in which agents make 
their decisions in chronological sequence, but later-moving agents re-
main ignorant of prior agents’ decisions, would be considered simulta-
neous rather than sequential for purposes of the present discussion.) 
While many decisionmaking systems rely principally on simultane-
ous contributions (for example, many voting systems and some forms 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  134  This characterization of the minority judge’s incentives would be less apt in contexts where 
a dissent — especially a well-researched and well-reasoned dissent — could have substantial in-
fluence with a broader audience or on future decisions, even if it did not alter the outcome of the 
present case.  See Cross & Tiller, supra note 130, at 2159 & n.17.  Thus, the incentive effects de-
scribed in this section are likely to be relatively weaker in such settings, though they may still ex-
ist to some degree. 
  135  See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 53, at 6–7; Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments, supra note 
4, at 31–33.    
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of horizontal redundancy), others employ sequential aggregation of in-
formation.  For example, appeals systems (and other forms of hierar-
chical oversight) often involve sequential investigation of the same is-
sue, first by a front-line agent (such as a lower court or programmatic 
agency), then by an oversight agent (such as an appellate court or a 
centralized regulatory review body).  Likewise, systems that develop 
bodies of law or policy over time, through something like a precedent-
based common law approach, can be thought of as entailing a kind of 
sequential aggregation of information.  These systems differ in that 
hierarchical oversight involves subsequent review of the same decision, 
whereas the development of common law involves a series of different 
(but related) decisions.  Nonetheless, these systems share the common 
feature that, in contrast to secret-ballot voting and other forms of si-
multaneous information aggregation, appeals systems and common law 
systems allow later decisionmakers to incorporate the information con-
tained in earlier decisions. 
This additional information can be an advantage.  Indeed, systems 
that operate according to common law principles, or something similar, 
are often celebrated for their ability to draw on the accumulated wis-
dom of past experience.136  And much of the literature on hierarchical 
review similarly notes the fact that the reviewing agent can use the de-
cision below as an important source of information when making its 
ruling.137  Sequential decisionmaking systems, however, are also vul-
nerable to certain well-known pathologies, chief among them “infor-
mation cascades” (sometimes also known as “herding”), in which sub-
sequent decisionmakers ignore their own information in favor of 
following prior judgments, on the logic that there is more information 
contained in the earlier decision (or decisions) than in the present deci-
sionmaker’s own independent assessment of the evidence.138  T h e  
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  136  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN,  MANY  MINDS,  supra note 4, at 36–55,  107–11; David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (1996). 
  137  See Fox & Stephenson, supra note 94 (manuscript at 22–23); Fox & Van Weelden, supra note 
94, at 679–81, 683; Vermeule, Second Opinions, supra note 4, at 8; cf. Charles M. Cameron et al., 
Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Cer-
tiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 104 (2000) (analyzing a setting in which the over-
seer may draw inferences from the first agent’s action when deciding whether to review that ac-
tion, but the overseer’s decision on the merits is independent of the first agent’s choice); Spitzer & 
Talley, supra note 77, at 658 (same). 
  138  See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 (1992); 
Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informa-
tional Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 1001 (1992); Robert J. Shiller, Conversation, Information, 
and Herd Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 181, 181 (1995).  For discussions of the information cas-
cade problem specifically in the context of public law and institutional design, see, for example, 
SUNSTEIN, MANY MINDS, supra note 4, at 171–73; Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinga-
num, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 158, 180–82 (1999); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 746–60; Eric Talley, Prece-
dential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 121–24 (1999); Vermeule, Many-Minds 
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problem with an information cascade is that it can stifle the further 
aggregation of useful information.  There is an extensive literature, in 
both law and social science, on the information cascade problem, as 
well as other difficulties that may arise from strategic interactions in 
sequential decision settings.139  The limited aim of this section is to 
suggest some additional considerations that may be relevant when 
each agent’s research effort is endogenous. 
Consider a setting involving the simplest form of sequential deci-
sionmaking by multiple agents: a two-period hierarchical oversight 
system in which the first agent (the “agency”) makes some decision 
(say, whether to regulate a potentially hazardous substance), and a 
second agent (the “overseer”) decides whether to uphold, reverse, or 
modify that decision.  Note that this setup is quite similar to the set-
ting considered in section II.C, in which the overseer could review, and 
potentially reject or revise, the decision made by the agent.  The dif-
ference is that in the earlier example the overseer could not make its 
own independent research investment; the overseer observed only the 
agent’s information (II.C.1), only her research effort (II.C.3), or nothing 
at all (II.C.2).  In the present setting, the overseer may also acquire in-
formation, but doing so is costly. 
The first important observation about this setting is that the endo-
geneity of research effort may intensify the information cascade prob-
lem.  In the basic version of the problem, a later-moving agent may ig-
nore her own assessment of the evidence if it contradicts the 
information implicit in the earlier decision (or decisions).  But if the 
later-moving agent’s information is good enough, she will still use it.  
In the two-period oversight context sketched above, this possibility 
means that the overseer will “defer” to the agency’s judgment if, but 
only if, the agency’s signal is believed to be of sufficiently higher quali-
ty than the overseer’s.  If, however, the overseer must invest costly ef-
fort in order to learn useful information, the overseer might rationally 
prefer not to do her own research and to defer instead to the agency’s 
decision.  Put another way, if the earlier decision is sufficiently infor-
mative, the overseer’s default payoff is relatively high, which reduces 
her research incentive. 
The same consideration applies even when the overseer would al-
ways make at least some use of her own information, for example, by 
changing policy incrementally.  When incremental policy change is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Arguments, supra note 4, at 31–33; Vermeule, Parliament, supra note 4, at 2253–56; and Vermeule, 
Second Opinions, supra note 4, at 15.  A similar phenomenon — that of “yes men” — may arise 
when the first-moving agent can anticipate what the later-moving agent will believe and has a 
material incentive to report the result that the later-moving agent is most likely to view as correct.  
See Prendergast, supra note 24, at 757–58. 
  139  See sources cited supra notes 137–138.    
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possible, the standard version of the information cascade problem is 
mitigated, since later-moving agents can continue to make rational use 
of their information; that their own information may not lead to very 
large changes in policy is immaterial, as that information is still effi-
ciently aggregated with the information contained in prior decisions.140  
If each agent’s signal is exogenous, one might conclude that so long as 
agents are not constrained to make crude categorical decisions, infor-
mation cascades are not a serious problem.  That optimistic conclusion 
is drawn into question when each agent’s research effort is endogen-
ous: if later-moving agents recognize that their information will lead 
only to very small incremental policy changes, they may not have suf-
ficiently strong incentives to invest in high-quality information.141  
This effect gives rise to a vicious cycle, as low-quality information is 
even less likely to result in meaningful policy changes. 
The above discussion suggests (tentatively) that endogenous infor-
mation acquisition may exacerbate the information cascade problem 
by reducing later-moving agents’ incentives to invest in research.  En-
dogenous information acquisition may, however, have quite different 
implications for the behavior of early-moving agents.  One possibility 
is that if the agency can anticipate that the overseer will defer to its 
decision, then the agency may have a greater incentive to invest sub-
stantial effort in research than it would if it could be confident that the 
overseer would provide a meaningful second look.  The intuition here 
is that the agency knows it is operating without a safety net and so is 
likely to devote more effort to information acquisition than it would if 
the overseer’s research effort were exogenous.142  Thus, a sequential 
decision setting may induce an equilibrium in which there is more in-
tense investigation at the first stage, and laxer investigation at the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  140  Cf. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intra-
judicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 764 (2002) (developing a model in which a 
judge can change precedent incrementally in order to preserve the informational value of the 
prior line of precedent while also shifting the legal rule in the direction of the judge’s ideal). 
  141  Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 75–77 (arguing that judges have an incentive to conserve 
decisionmaking costs by following precedent, which in turn can lead to cascades and information-
al free riding). 
  142  The Supreme Court has adverted to (though not fully embraced) similar logic to explain the 
value of judicial deference to a magistrate judge’s decision that probable cause existed to support 
a warrant application, when the court is called upon after the fact to assess that determination.  
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 167 (1978) (“The less final, and less deference paid to, the 
magistrate’s determination of [the] veracity [of the statements contained in the warrant applica-
tion], the less initiative will he use in that task.  Denigration of the magistrate’s function would be 
imprudent insofar as his scrutiny is the last bulwark preventing any particular invasion of privacy 
before it happens.”).  This example is especially interesting in that an important action — the 
search — may occur in between the decisions of the first and second agents.  This timing may 
suggest an even greater cost to diminishing the first-moving agent’s incentive to do costly 
investigation.    
1478  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 124:1422 
second stage, than one would observe in a world where information is 
exogenous. 
There is a second possibility, however.  Suppose the overseer can 
observe not only the agency’s decision, but also the agency’s research 
effort.  If the agency invests very little in research, the overseer’s op-
timal response will be to discount the agency’s decision and to do its 
own investigation of the problem.  Because the agency can anticipate 
this response, it may be rational for the agency to do little or no re-
search, because the agency knows the overseer will pick up the slack.  
Thus, instead of an equilibrium in which the agency invests heavily in 
research and the overseer acts as a rubber stamp, there may be an 
equilibrium in which the agency shirks its responsibilities and the 
overseer ends up doing all the work.143  Both of these equilibria de-
viate considerably from the “second look” or “accumulated wisdom” 
idea that often undergirds arguments for sequential decisionmaking 
(whether in the form of oversight or in the form of common law 
decisionmaking).144 
The above logic further suggests a nonmonotonic relationship be-
tween the degree of preference divergence among agents and the 
amount that each agent will invest in research.  When the preferences 
of the agency and the overseer are closely aligned, the agency knows 
that if it shirks on research, the overseer will pick up the slack and se-
lect a policy that is very close to the policy that the agency would pre-
fer if the agency were well informed.  When the preferences of the 
agency and the overseer are far apart, the agency knows that even if it 
invests extensively in research, the overseer will not trust the agency’s 
policy judgment but will instead conduct independent research into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  143  One illustration of this sort of phenomenon is Professor James Bradley Thayer’s argument 
that judicial review causes legislators to pay less attention to investigating and deliberating about 
potential constitutional problems with proposed legislation.  See James B. Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893); see 
also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–58 (1999); 
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 261–62; Vermeule, Second Opinions, supra note 4, at 28.  This prob-
lem might be attenuated, however, if the legislature suffers some reputational cost when a court 
reverses the legislature’s decision.  See Fox & Stephenson, supra note 94 (manuscript at 17–20). 
  144  Modern expositions of the idea that the common law reflects an accumulated stock of wis-
dom typically presume that each successive judge’s decision is informed by new information that 
is integrated into the line of precedent.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, MANY MINDS, supra note 4, at 36–
41; Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal For-
malism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights,  9 U.  PA.  J.  CONST. L. 155,  191–92 ( 2006); 
Strauss, supra note 136, at 891–92; Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and 
the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 581–83 (2008).  Likewise, most analyses of 
the “error-correction” benefits associated with hierarchical appellate systems assume that the ac-
curacy of the information of both the initial evaluator (for example, the trial court) and the over-
seer (for example, the appellate court) is exogenous; the focus of these analyses is typically on the 
selection of disputes for appeal.  See, e.g., Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 77, at 178; Daughe-
ty & Reinganum, supra note 77, at 512–13; Spitzer & Talley, supra note 77, at 658, 660–62.    
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the issue.145  The agency will therefore again shirk on research, leaving 
both the research work and the ultimate decision to the overseer.   
When the preferences of the agency and the overseer diverge some-
what, but not too much, the outcome may be quite different: In this 
case, although the overseer knows that its preferences differ from those 
of the agency, the overseer will be willing to defer to the agency’s deci-
sion so long as the agency invests extensively in researching the issue.  
Although the overseer can improve the expected quality of the final 
decision by doing its own research, the research costs may not justify 
the expected gains.  The agency, knowing this, will recognize that it 
can get its ideal policy outcome if it invests sufficient research effort.  
Under some circumstances, an agency with policy preferences that di-
verge moderately from those of the overseer will be willing to bear the 
research costs in order to secure a more favorable policy outcome, 
while the overseer will be willing to accept a somewhat less desirable 
policy outcome in order to avoid the costs of research.  If the overseer 
is the principal (or a perfect agent of the principal), the above analysis 
implies another deviation from the ally principle: the principal may 
prefer an agent with moderately divergent preferences over a perfect 
ally, so that the agent, rather than the principal, will bear the research 
costs associated with the policy decision. 
C.  Competitive Information Provision 
To this point, the analysis of multi-agent systems has emphasized 
the collective action problem that may arise when several agents are 
responsible for producing decision-relevant information.  If it were 
possible to compensate agents directly for their research efforts or to 
base their compensation on the observed quality of the final decision, 
then mitigating this problem would be relatively straightforward.  But 
as discussed earlier, in many public policy contexts this is not feasible.  
However, it may be feasible to base each agent’s reward on the content 
of the final decision, and to do so in a way that induces desirable com-
petition among agents to produce useful information.  There are two 
main types of competitive systems that an institutional designer inter-
ested in improving research incentives might employ: advocacy sys-
tems and tournament systems.146 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  145  See Gailmard, supra note 85, at 550–53. 
  146  This Article focuses on institutional arrangements that seek to induce competition among 
government agents, bracketing a related set of questions about how governments might harness 
information dispersed among private citizens through competitive market mechanisms (such as 
privatization of certain government functions or the expanded use of prediction markets).  See, 
e.g., ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 30, at 283–84 (discussing how prediction markets can improve 
government decisionmaking).  It is again worth noting that the government’s decision of whether 
or how to exploit private competition to improve public policy is itself a public decision that may 
require research into the efficacy of market mechanisms.    
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In an advocacy system, the principal (or an adjudicator acting on 
the principal’s behalf) specifies an array of possible policy choices and 
assigns a different agent to advocate for each one.  An advocate re-
ceives a reward if the adjudicator selects the alternative that the advo-
cate represents.147  As long as each advocate can improve her odds of 
winning (that is, of having her policy alternative adopted) by providing 
useful information that supports her side, then an advocacy system can 
induce greater research than would occur if a single “neutral” agent 
were charged with investigating the issue.  This advantage may some-
times outweigh the disadvantages associated with turning key aspects 
of the policy process over to “biased” advocates.148  Although the neu-
tral agent will weigh the evidence appropriately ex post, she will also 
recognize that there is some chance the evidence she acquires will 
point in different directions.  Such conflicting evidence would lead her 
to make approximately the same decision she would have made had 
she not invested so much in research, thus dampening her incentive to 
conduct extensive research in the first place.149  The benefit associated 
with stimulating research through competitive advocacy comes at a 
price, of course.  Biased advocates will sometimes suppress useful in-
formation, and in some cases, the advocacy system will stimulate too 
much (possibly redundant) research.  It is also possible that the incen-
tives an advocacy system creates will stimulate undesirable behaviors 
— including behaviors that worsen information gathering, such as fa-
brication or distortion of evidence.  But in many cases, these costs may 
be outweighed by the greater research incentives that the competitive 
advocacy scheme induces.150 
The above analysis assumes that the pieces of information gathered 
by competing advocates are (partial) substitutes, or at least that the 
complementarities among pieces of evidence are not very strong.   
When there are strong complementarities among different pieces of in-
formation, however, the case for assigning the task of researching these 
different types of information to competing advocates, rather than to a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  147  Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1, 13–15 (1999). 
  148  See id. at 16–17, 25, 34; see also David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Competitive Lobby-
ing for a Legislator’s Vote, 9 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 229, 245 (1992) (arguing that legislators 
are more likely to vote correctly if they are lobbied by advocates on only one side of an issue than 
if they are not lobbied at all); Hongbin Cai, Costly Participation and Heterogeneous Preferences 
in Informational Committees, 40 RAND J. ECON. 173, 174 (2009) (arguing that, “under certain 
conditions, heterogeneous preferences [among biased agents] provide [agents] incentives to gather 
information”); Krishna & Morgan, supra note 86, at 767 (2001) (explaining that decisionmakers 
can derive full information even from experts with “opposing biases” under circumstances that 
allow for full debate and rebuttal).  But cf. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, Information-
al Lobbying and Political Contributions, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 631, 632 (2006) (arguing that certain 
“information externalit[ies]” reduce the incentive for biased agents to engage in robust research). 
  149  See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra note 147, at 11–12. 
  150  Id. at 33–34.    
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single neutral party, may weaken or collapse.  To see this possibility, 
suppose that a legislature is considering two alternatives to the status 
quo, A and B, and that there are two pieces of information, X and Y, 
that might bear on this decision.  The legislature would prefer to select 
one of the alternatives to the status quo only if both pieces of evidence 
support that decision; one piece of evidence alone, or contradictory 
pieces of evidence, would be insufficient to convince the legislature to 
adopt a new policy.  If a single neutral agent is assigned the task of re-
searching both X and Y, she may have an incentive to do so, as such 
research might lead to a desirable change from the status quo (to either 
A or B), even though the agent’s incentives are dampened by the fact 
that if the pieces of evidence conflict (say, if X supports A but Y sup-
ports B), she will have wasted her research effort.  But if the legisla-
ture assigns the tasks of researching X and Y to competing advocates, 
one of whom supports A and one of whom supports B, then neither 
advocate will invest in research.  Each advocate knows that she alone 
cannot persuade the principal to implement any policy other than the 
status quo; any information she provides is useless unless the other ad-
vocate provides complementary information.  But each advocate also 
knows that her adversary has no incentive to do so.  Thus, dividing 
the task of producing complementary forms of information between 
competing advocates may have perverse effects. 
A tournament system, like an advocacy system, seeks to exploit 
competitive pressures among agents to improve research incentives, 
but in a somewhat different way.  While in an advocacy system each 
agent is matched with a preexisting policy option, in a tournament sys-
tem each agent may design her own policy response to some problem 
and present her solution to the principal (or an assessor who acts on 
the principal’s behalf).  The agent whose proposal is selected then re-
ceives some reward.151  If the likelihood that a proposal is selected is 
positively correlated with the quality of the evidence developed in 
support of that proposal, then this reward serves as an incentive for 
each agent to do extensive research.  The advantage of a tournament 
system over an advocacy system is that even modest improvements in 
each agent’s proposal may lead to a very large reward, which, at least 
under the right conditions, tends to spur greater effort. 
The similarity of the tournament system to the advocacy system, at 
least in terms of the effect on agents’ research incentives, is immediate-
ly apparent.  Indeed, many of the costs and benefits are similar and 
need not be restated.  Tournament systems, like advocacy systems, are 
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  151  See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Con-
tracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 844–47 (1981); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes and 
Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21, 
26–30 (1983); Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981).    
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desirable insofar as they induce competition on socially beneficial di-
mensions — of greatest interest here, the production of useful informa-
tion about policy alternatives.  But tournaments may also entail se-
rious costs, especially if they induce competition along undesirable 
dimensions (for example, by inducing greater distortion of information 
or attempts to sabotage competitors’ efforts) or if they divide up re-
sponsibility and expertise for investigating complementary aspects of a 
problem.152  These systems are also costly insofar as they involve so-
cially wasteful duplication of effort. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the great and lasting accomplishments of the Legal Process 
school was bringing issues of institutional design to the forefront of the 
study of public law.  Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
succinctly summarize this key tenet of the Legal Process school: 
In a government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ has a spe-
cial competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just fig-
uring out what is the best policy, but figuring out which institutions should be 
making which decisions and how all the institutions should interrelate.153 
More recent public law scholarship — a “New Legal Process” school154 
— has built on this insight, combining traditional legal analysis with 
theories and methods drawn from other disciplines to assess how best 
to allocate decisionmaking authority in light of the relative competence 
of different public institutions.155 
However, the Legal Process insight that institutional design choices 
must take into account the relative competence of different govern-
ment agents is incomplete, and potentially misleading, because it neg-
lects the extent to which institutional choices may change the relative 
competence of different government agents.  Institutional choices that 
appear prudent when government agents’ expertise is treated as ex-
ogenous may turn out to be counterproductive when such agents’ ex-
pertise is endogenous.  Likewise, seemingly inefficient institutional 
choices may turn out to be desirable when the impact on information-
gathering incentives is considered.  Attention to the endogeneity of in-
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  152  One possible difference between tournament systems and advocacy systems — and an ad-
vantage of the former over the latter — is that outcomes need not be specified in advance.  This 
feature may also facilitate the participation of a larger number of potential competitors, though it 
is possible to have a “tournament” of two competitors, or an adversarial hearing with three or 
more competing advocates. 
  153  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at lx. 
  154  See generally Rubin, supra note 2; Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal 
Process,  77 C ALIF.  L.  REV.  919 ( 1989) (reviewing WILLIAM  N.  ESKRIDGE,  JR.  &  PHILIP  P. 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988)).  
  155  See sources cited supra notes 2–4.    
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formation highlights the fact that in many contexts, feasibility con-
straints force an institutional designer to try to achieve two separate 
goals (such as efficient ex post use of information and efficient ex ante 
acquisition of information) with only one tool, in a way that creates an 
unavoidable trade-off. 
Assessing the impact of any particular institutional design choice 
on the government’s acquisition of decision-relevant information 
would require an in-depth contextual analysis well beyond the scope of 
this Article.  Yet this Article has tried to show that there are a few use-
ful basic principles, as well as some midlevel generalizations about the 
effects of particular classes of legal and institutional rules, that might 
prove helpful in guiding such a context-specific inquiry.  At the most 
general level, an institutional change is likely to increase a government 
agent’s research incentives if it either lowers the agent’s marginal re-
search cost or increases her marginal research benefit.  The latter con-
sideration — the focus of the analysis in this Article — can be further 
decomposed into two factors: the agent’s default payoff (her expected 
utility from declining to invest additional resources in information ga-
thering) and her research payoff (her expected utility if she does make 
such an investment).  Lowering the former, or raising the latter, strength-
ens an agent’s research incentives. 
This seemingly simple observation turns out to have a great deal of 
utility: As this Article has shown, a great variety of legal and institu-
tional choices can be assessed with respect to their likely impact on an 
agent’s default payoff and research payoff.  One can lower an agent’s 
default payoff by, for example, prohibiting the agent from taking her 
ex ante preferred action or imposing more stringent procedural or evi-
dentiary requirements on that action.  One can also worsen an agent’s 
default payoff by removing safety nets — such as the input of other 
agents or a second look by an oversight body — that increase the odds 
that the agent will realize an acceptable outcome even if she does very 
little work.  One can raise an agent’s research payoff by expanding her 
discretion and autonomy or by raising the relative attractiveness of de-
cisions that seem undesirable ex ante.  Under some circumstances, one 
can raise the research payoff more directly, by offering a reward — 
perhaps in the form of more discretion — if the agent demonstrates 
substantial research investment.  One might further raise the research 
payoff by dividing research tasks among separate agents or by stimu-
lating competition among agents with respect to overlapping research 
tasks.  These and other observations suggest the usefulness of more 
fully integrating considerations of endogenous government expertise 
into New Legal Process research on optimal institutional design in 
public law. 